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SUMMARY 
This consultancy was commissioned by the Namibian Agronomic Board 
(NAB) with the objective of making recommendations on the appropriate 
types, ownership, management and capacities of on and off-farm storage of 
mahangu, maize and sorghum in the Northern Communal Areas (NCA), and 
to assess the need for holding strategic grain reserves. 
With regard to mahangu, the main needs are as follows: 
• In the North-Central Regions, there is an overwhelming need for improved 
on-farm storage to prevent attack by the moth Corcyra cephalonica, which 
may be causing physical losses in excess of 10% by weight, depending on 
how long farmers store the grain. Given the high prices of storage baskets 
made from Mopane trees, there is also a need for cheaper on-farm storage 
structures. Various possible storage improvements are discussed 
including lining baskets with polythene, and new structures such as 
galvanised iron, fibre-glass or plastic storage bins. A programme of trials is 
proposed, followed by promotion of the most viable technologies. The 
State and possibly NGOs should provide services in the area of R&D, 
training and extension, quality control, monitoring adoption and trouble 
shooting, while inputs and structures should be distributed by the private 
sector though regular commercial channels. 
• In Kavango, emergency off-farm storage in roadside locations is needed to 
store the mahangu produced by mechanised FSP producers and Agribank 
borrowers in the 1997 harvest. This is to protect the grain from rain and 
infestation in the field, and to facilitate marketing at the best possible price. 
Grain should first be stored in available NDC warehouses, and where 
these are not available the most viable option is probably to store in the 
open on poles. The volume of storage required is estimated at 4,000 
tonnes. lt is suggested that NDC carries out the storage, given its 
involvement in supporting these farmers and interest in securing 
repayment of loans. 
• Given that the financial viability of mechanised and high-input mahangu 
production has not been established, no long-term storage arrangements 
or permanent storage structures are proposed for these groups of farmers. 
Notwithstanding this, in both North-Central and Kavango Regions, 
temporary storage arrangements will periodically be needed following 
successive bumper crops. We estimate that this will happen at least once 
(and at most twice) every 10 years, with the maximum storage requirement 
being about 10,000 tonnes. There are likely to be smaller surplus 
conditions about two years out of ten, calling for off-farm storage capacity 
of no more than 2,500 tonnes. The capacity should be provided by private 
sector players, including farmers' groups and co-operatives, specialised 
storage operators, and buyers interested in the procurement of mahangu 
for processing. Training is needed to ensure that the necessary technical 
capability is available as and when needed to store mahangu successfully 
either in the open air or in warehouses. Emergency funding may 
occasionally be needed for the acquisition of poles and tarpaulins and 
these may be loaned to the relevant organisations. 
1 
The authors also examined the commercial marketing of mahangu, given that 
this could have a role in absorbing the periodic mahangu surpluses referred 
to above, while more significantly, satisfying strong consumer preferences for 
mahangu over maize meal. NDC has expended considerable efforts in this 
area since 1993, but the activity has left unanswered important questions 
about the potential scale and other features of the market for mahangu 
products. 
Local processing is already being developed in the NCA, but to fully exploit 
market potential - particularly in Southern Namibia - it will be necessary to 
involve companies skilled in the development and marketing of fast-moving 
consumer goods (FMCGs), and capable of keeping mahangu meal on 
grocery shelves throughout the year. However FMCG marketers are only 
likely to get involved if there are prospects of reasonably stable raw material 
supplies, and this depends on finding other countries from which mahangu 
can be imported when Nambia is in short supply. At the same time 
Government will need to give assurances about not intervening in the market 
(for drought relief or other purpuses) as this could upset the supply situation. 
With regard to maize, particular attention was paid to the needs of flood-
plain producers in Caprivi, and findings were as follows: 
• On-farm storage - grain should be threshed as early as possible and stored 
in bags on raised platforms with ratguards, under protective shelters. 
Insecticide should be used to protect bagged grain. 
• Off-farm storage - grain should be evacuated to "Assembly Depots" which 
may be either centralised in Katima Mulilo or decentralised at locations 
adjacent to the flood-plain. Open storage on poles should be used except 
where suitable warehouses can be found. The total quantity stored will be 
very variable, depending on the harvest, but the minimum requirement is 
estimated at 1 ,000 tonnes. Farmers should be encouraged to form local 
groups to organise the assembly of grain, while they should probably 
employ specialist agencies to carry out storage and marketing on a 
commission basis. Before any steps are taken, there should be a thorough 
participatory planning exercise, involving needs assessment and a 
feasibility study. 
Sorghum is produced in relatively small quantities, and the need for off-farm 
storage is negligible. However, the threshed grain, particularly of red 
sorghum, is more susceptible to storage pests than is mahangu, and this is 
restricting the amount of grain that farmers can safely harvest and store. With 
a view to avoiding unnecessary use of insecticides, it is suggested that 
farmers be advised to store sorghum unthreshed, as this will allow safe 
storage for at least one year. 
There authors can find no case for Government establishing a strategic 
grain reserve, given that: 
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• many farmers already hold their own strategic stocks - two years' mahangu 
requirements- for food security purposes; 
• Nambia enjoys easy access to world grain markets; 
• the costs of holding reserves is high (upwards of 20% of grain cost per 
annum), and; 
• the management of such reserves tends to become dominated by short-
term political considerations, resulting in unnecessary financial losses and 
damage to local grain markets. 
Certain key principles and concepts underly the above proposals, i.e.: 
• The fundamental importance of on-farm storage in assuring food security 
at household and village level 
• The need for local self-reliance and co-operation in an increasingly 
changing environment 
• The need to develop specialist service providers, e.g. in the area of 
storage and food marketing 
• The role of the State and NGOs in facilitating local initiative 
Key findings concerning on-farm storage are summarised in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
Place Category of Crop Disposal Period Site Store type Pest control required 
farmer* ' 
Caprivi Flood-plain Maize Household < 1 year At house Cobs with None needed I 
and rain-fed husks in I 
basket I 
Flood-plain Maize Commercial sales, To allow On-farm: Bag store On-farm: Contact insectide, raised platforms 1 
where possible drying, bagged. Off- with ratguards & keep dry. 
taking advantage of threshing, farm: at Off-farm: Clean bags and store, dunnage, I 
early harvesting bagging and Assembly good stacking, regular inspections, 
marketing Depots fumigation with phosphine at 1 gm I m3 every 
4 month 
Kavango C3 Mahangu Household < 1 year On-farm Bin None 
C2 + 1 Mahangu Household 1 year On-farm Bin None 
C2 + 1 Mahangu Household 2 years On-farm Bin or bags Plastic liners, pesticides or new structures 
Mechanised Mahangu Commercial sales < 1 year Off-farm Bag store Clean bags, clean store, dunnage, good 
+ C1 (emergency Assembly stacking, regular inspections 
operation for 1997) Depot 
North- C3 Mahangu Household < 1 year At house Basket Clean and re-mud interior of basket before 
Central filling with new crop 
Regions 
C1 + 2 Mahangu Household 2 years At house Basket Experiment with physical methods for 
excluding Corcyra cephalonica 
C1 + 2 + 3 Beans and Household 1 year At house Bags and Use wood ash at 1 part ash to 20 parts grain; 
cowpeas drums experiment with soaking and drying legumes 
C1 + 2 + 3 Sorghum Household brewing 1 year At house Bags, bins Store on the head; white varieties not 
and baskets susceptible to insect pests 
C1 + 2 Mahangu Commercial sales < 1 year Off-farm Bag store Clean bags and store, dunnage, good 
(occasional) Assembly stacking, regular inspections 
Dep. 
-
* See Table 4 for definition of categories of farmer 
floor of a warehouse 
** dunnage = pallets or other material placed under maize stacks to prevent direct contact with the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This consultancy was commissioned by the Namibian Agronomic Board 
(NAB), with funds from the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development (MAWRD), and carried out in September and October 1997. 
The objectives were to make recommendations on the appropriate types, 
ownership, management and capacities of on and off-farm grain storage of 
mahangu, maize and sorghum in the Northern Communal Areas (NCA), and 
to assess the need for holding strategic grain reserves. Terms of reference 
are as shown in Appendix 1, as well as amendments agreed with the Steering 
Committee at a meeting on September 16. 
The consultancy was carried out by an agricultural marketing economist and 
a grain storage specialist, who visited Kavango, Caprivi and the North-Central 
Regions in the days 5 - 17 October, collecting information from institutional 
and trade sources and through a series of farm visits - see Appendix 2 for list 
of persons met. Limited time was available for the visit to Caprivi, and at the 
client's request, particular attention was focused on the storage needs of 
flood-plain maize producers. 
The terms of reference contain eleven "detailed tasks". To address these in a 
logical sequence, we have structured the report as follows. Section 2 
discusses the needs for new and improved storage, on or off-farm, and at the 
level of strategic grain reserves. Section 3 discusses key issues in the design 
of solutions addressing these needs. Section 4 is specific in recommending 
how these needs should be addressed. Section 5 discusses impact of a 
SADC free market on our recommended options. 
The terms of reference do not ask for recommendations concerning the 
marketing of cereals. However to provide recommendations about off-farm 
storage, one must first ask for what purpose one is storing. This subject has 
been investigated by Namibia Resource Consultants (NRC) as part of their 
study of the Mahangu Market Intelligence Unit (MMIU); we have kept close 
contact with the NRC study, and given the importance of the subject in 
deciding on storage policy, have ourselves made some enquiries in the area. 
Appendix 4 provides our own observations on the marketing of commercial 
mahangu production. 
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TABLE 2: NAMIBIA COARSE GRAIN PRODUCTION 
Region and 1991/92 Production Season 1992/93 Production Season 1993194 Production Season 
Type of Cereal '000 ha kg I ha '000 mt '000 ha 
f:lorjh/Central Regions * 
Ohangwena; MilleUSorghum 
Omusati; MllleUSorghum 
Oshana; MilleUSorghum 
Oshikoto; MilleUSorghum 
SubTotal 150.0 100 15.0 143.0 
Kavango 
Maize (Rainfed) 2.5 0 0.0 0.0 
Maize NDC (Irrigated) 0.5 6500 3.2 0.5 
MllleUSorghum NDC/FSP 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
MilleUSorghum; subs.farmers 12.3 100 1.2 17.0 
Sub Total 15.3 4.4 17.5 
Caprivi 
Maize 13.0 30 0.4 14.8 
Millet I Sorghum 14.3 70 1.0 11.2 
Sub Total 27.3 1.4 26.0 
Commercial Sector 
Maize (Rainfed) 22.6 230 5.2 14.0 
Maize (Irrigated) 0.8 4760 4.0 0.2 
Sub Total 23.5 9.2 14.1 
I Total Coarse Grain 11 216.1 I I 30.0 11 200.61 
* No break-down by region available before the 1994/95 season 
Totals may not add up due to roundlngs 
Source: Namibian Early Warning & Food lnfonnalion System 
kg /ha ·ooo mt ·ooo ha kg /ha ·ooomt 
240 34.3 272.0 200 54.4 
0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
5500 2.9 0.6 3500 2.0 
0 0.0 4.4 685 3.0 
260 4.4 22.2 420 9.3 
7.3 27.2 14.4 
590 8.7 14.0 230 3.2 
445 5.0 12.1 200 2.4 
13.7 26.1 5.6 
970 13.5 17.3 1990 34.4 
6250 1.0 0.6 6500 3.9 
14.5 17.9 38.3 
I 69.911 343.21 I 112.711 
Forecast 
1994195 Production Season 1995196 Production Season 1996/97 Production Season 
·ooo ha kg I ha 'OOOmt ·ooo ha kg /ha 'OOOmt '000 ha kg/ha 'OOOmt 
65.0 175 14.9 89.0 235 20.9 89.7 350 31.4 
90.0 90 8.1 72.0 250 16.0 91.8 350 32.1 
35.0 120 4.2 35.0 185 6.5 39.0 330 12.9 
65.0 100 6.5 65.0 100 6.5 66.0 380 25.1 
275.0 33.7 261.0 51.9 286.5 101.5 
0.0 0 0.0 0.3 1910 0.6 0.5 2300 1.3 
0.4 6675 2.5 0.5 5450 2.6 0.6 5300 3.2 
3.0 685 2.0 5.6 770 4.3 4.2 900 . 3.8 
11 .8 210 2.5 19.8 250 4.9 22.0 365 8.0 
15.1 7.0 26.1 12.4 27.3 16.3 
9.0 175 1.6 12.5 400 5.0 16.2 665 10.8 
8.6 295 2.5 10.6 320 3.4 9.0 420 3.6 
17.6 4.1 23.1 8.4 25.2 14.6 
7.5 385 2.9 13.0 640 8.3 13.2 2285 30.1 
1.1 5550 6.1 0.3 4900 1.6 0.2 6630 1.6 
8.6 9.0 13.4 10.0 13.4 31.7 
316.41 I 53.811 323.61 I 82.711 352.51 I 164.01 
2. THE NEED FOR NEW OR IMPROVED ON AND 
OFF-FARM STORAGE 
2.1 Production and self-sufficiency in cereals 
Table 2 shows Early Warning data for Namibia coarse grain production in the 
NCA Regions and commercial sector. By and large harvests have been poor 
in the 1990s, but in 1997 there was an unusually good harvest. If we 
assume that annual per capita grain requirements are around 100 kg, the 
normal pattern has been one of deficit, though all Regions seem to have 
produced a surplus in 1997- see Table 3. 
TABLE 3: COARSE GRAIN PRODUCTION PER 
CAPITA BY NCA REGION 
Region Production per capita per marketing (kg) 
season 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
North-Central Regions 26 57 54 85 79 150 
Kavango 36 59 113 54 93 119 
Caprivi . 14 133 52 36 70 115 
Source: Namibian Early Warning System; official population projections based on last census 
Such crude estimates of surplus and deficit are quite hazardous. The 
Namibian Early Warning System estimates per capita consumption to be 135 
kg, but private industry uses much lower estimates (NAB, pers. comm.), on 
the grounds that the diet is quite diverse. Notably, the diet includes 
significant quantities of purchased maize meal, even in bumper crop years. 
On the other hand, the extraction rate (or milling yield) through traditional 
processing of mahangu is very low (50-60% according to trials carried out by 
Dendy, 1993), and this will tend to depress the size of the surplus. 
2.2 Storage needs in Caprivi 
2.2.1 Maize 
Caprivi produces maize under two production regimes: flood-plain and rain-
fed. Flood-plain production is more consistent, as farmers can generally get a 
harvest regardless of whether water levels are high or low; moreover high 
yields can be obtained without the addition of fertiliser. 
There is uncertainty about the volume of production, though it is clear that 
there is much variability between years. According to Table 2, production in 
the 1990s has varied between a minimum of 400 tonnes in the El Niiio year of 
1992 to 10,800 tonnes in 1997. None of the sources we consulted could 
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supply data on the proportion of production accounted for respectively by 
flood-plain and rain-fed maize. 
We visited producers in a location called Zobue, and the findings are shown 
in Appendix 3. Production is severely handicapped by transport difficulties in 
an area where water-logging and the lack of roads mean that maize can only 
be moved out during part of the year, from August to March or April - and for 
part of this time with considerable difficulty. The following problems were 
noted: 
(a) Despite harvesting from January, there is little incentive to move grain 
to market since the officially-regulated procurement system (which 
supports prices at above the fully free-market level) is not buying at 
that time. Apart from this, much of the grain has not dried out by the 
time that the floods come, in April. For these reasons grain is not 
moved to the market until August at the very earliest, and only with the 
greatest difficulty, using boats; most leaves by lorry when floods 
recede in October, and at this time procurement is well advanced. In 
1997, this proved highly disadvantageous, given that by the time 
farmers got their produce to market, millers had already acquired their 
allocation, and their only alteratives were to sell to the NAB at the 
buyer-of-last-resort price (12% below the into-mill guideline price), or if 
not judged to meet exacting quality standards of the feed miller, at a 
further N$200 discount. Late sellers, mainly marooned flood-plain 
farmers, were penalised. 
(b) Grain is stored on islands in the flood-plain in rudimentary stores and 
without chemical treatment. Consequently there are significant 
quantitative and qualitative storage losses (see discussion in Appendix 
3). The farmer loses financially because, firstly, substantial numbers of 
cobs are rejected prior to threshing and, secondly, insect and mould 
damaged grain is often rejected by buyers of milling-grade maize and 
forced into feed-grade channels 1• 
(c) Even when movement is possible, transport costs are high. Presently 
NDC offers a subsidised service -to ship from Zobue area in the flood-
plain to Katima Mu Iilo, this costs approximately N$55 per tonne, but 
private hauliers charge around N$133 per tonne. 
(d) The geographical dispersion and isolation of producers makes it 
difficult for them to develop a co-ordinated marketing strategy and 
maximise their bargaining power vis a vis buyers. 
Problem (a) could be partly addressed by organising NAB procurement in 
February and March, but a thoroughgoing solution would involve building a 
network of raised roads across the flood-plain, a proposition which might 
prove unacceptable on grounds of cost and environmental impact. Problem 
1 Some grain accepted for feed use did not appear to be highly infested. A possible 
explanation for this is that in a situation of over-supply at artificial support prices, unusually 
high quality norms have been set with a view to limiting volumes procured at the higher price. 
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(b) can easily be addressed by the application of simple storage technology 
(see Section 4.2). Problems (c) and (d) can be addressed if farmers 
concentrate their produce in commercial quantities in places like Bukalo, 
which are on permanent roads and relatively close to the flood-plain. 
However the economies of organising storage in such locations should be 
weighed against the possible organisational diseconomies of decentralised 
storage arrangements. 
Transport costs out of the flood-plain can be minimised by hiring tractors and 
trailers on a continuous basis, so as to obtain volume discounts. Farmers' 
marketing advantage can be maximised by playing the market and attracting 
buyers from as far afield as possible. Their existing marketing strategy is to 
sell to millers or Government at support prices, but Namibia's price support 
system is increasingly being questioned on domestic policy grounds, and is 
being practically undermined by the liberalisation of the Zambian and South 
African maize markets, which has brought about wide inter-annual price 
swings in that market. In the future farmers may find that their best option is 
to play regional markets, accepting low prices when there are gluts, and 
storing for high prices when there are shortages. 
While the brevity of our visit did not allow us to thoroughly research the 
situation, there are certain indications (i.e. the ability to produce with low 
inputs and in conditions of drought), that commercial maize production in 
flood-plain ares of Caprivi has long-term potential. By addressing the above-
mentioned problems, it may be possible to stimulate C_aprivi's maize 
producers. 
Our preliminary projection of storage requirements for maize in 
Caprivi are as follows: 
• On-farm storage- for domestic consumption, storage on cobs with husks is 
appropriate. In maize destined from the market, new arrangements are 
needed to minimise infestation. 
• Off-farm storage - "Assembly Depots" are needed with capacity to handle 
variable quantities of maize, upwards of 1 ,000 tonnes per annum. While 
designed specifically to facilitate marketing by flood-plain producers, these 
should also assist dry-land producers. 
2.2.2 Mahangu and sorghum 
Early Warning data indicates that Caprivi produced 3,800 tonnes of mahangu 
and sorghum in 1997 (see Table 2), while according to preliminary CSB data, 
more than half the quantity produced is sorghum. These cereals are mainly 
grown in the Western part of Caprivi, in limited quantities, so that whether in 
good or bad years, most producers only need to store for a few months after 
harvest. The small minority of farmers who produce surpluses over and 
above their own needs can usually dispose of them without much difficulty, by 
selling to deficit producers or non-producers, as grain or beer, or as payment 
for services rendered. In the bumper production year of 1997, a few 
producers have approached Likwama Farmers' Co-operative Union (LFCU) to 
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find additional outlets, and arrangements have been made to sell the grain to 
a local poultry producer. The quantity so far marketed in this way is quite 
small - about 20 tonnes. 
Our preliminary estimates of storage requirements for mahangu and 
sorghum in Caprivi are therefore as follows: 
• On-farm storage - adequate in terms of quantity. Time did not permit farm 
visits to assess the scope for improvements in the quality of storage, but 
there are likely to be storage problems similar to those noted in North-
Central Regions - see 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 below. 
• Off-farm storage - tens of tonnes in a high production year such as 1997, 
zero tonnes in a low or normal production year. This is being handled 
adequately through existing co-operative and trade mechanisms. 
2.3 Storage needs in Kavango 
2.3.1 Mahangu 
According to Early Warning data, combined mahangu and sorghum 
production in Kavango was 11 ,800 tonnes in 1997, of which 8,000 tonnes 
were produced by subsistence farmers and 3,800 tonnes under the NDC's 
Farmer Support Programme (FSP)- see Table 2. The Central Bureau of 
Statistics found total production to be only 3,436 tonnes (which appears 
strangely low), and of this amount, 89% was mahangu and 11% sorghum. 
A recent paper by the Rural Development Support Programme (RDSP) 
classifies NCA farmers into three categories as indicated in Box 4. 
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TABLE 4: RDSP CATEGORISATION OF NCA FARMERS 
C1 or "Advantaged" farmers with a cropping area of over 11 ha, ownership 
of draught animal power, household labour force of 6 or more, and usually 
having surplus crops for sale. They are estimated to constitute about 1 0% of 
farming households. 
C2 or "Transitional" farmers with a cropping area of 5 to 10 ha, ownership of 
draught animal power or with access to hire or borrowing, household labour 
force of 3 to 5, and often having surplus crops for sale. Estimated at 20% of 
farming households. 
C3 or "Disadvantaged" farmers with cropping area of less than 5 ha, no 
ownership of draught animal power and only limited access to hire or 
borrowing, household labour of less than 3, and not usually having surplus 
crops for sale. Estimated at 70% of farming households. 
In addition to these three, there is a fourth category of "Mechanised" 
farmers, who in 1997 planted between 25 and 400 ha of mahangu and 
sometimes smaller areas of cotton. They use tractors for land preparation 
and planting, apply fertiliser and have significant borrowings. There are 162 
such farmers financed by NDC (160) and Agribank (2), and their largest 
concentration is in the area of Katji-na-Katji, at 90 km on the road from Rundu 
to Grootfontein. 
Some 371 non-mechanised C1 farmers in Kavango Region also received 
production credit from Agribank, but at a lower rate (N$245 per ha) than their 
two mechanised borrowers (N$500 per ha). 
We may now discuss the storage requirements of each group of farmers: 
C3 farmers. These are more or less permanently in a deficit situation and 
supplies usually only last them for a few months. By and large, present 
storage arrangements, using traditional bins and baskets, are adequate and 
losses minimal. 
C2 and most C1 farmers. After good harvests, they often have more 
mahangu than is needed to cover their normal annual requirements, and 
stocks often last beyond the next harvest. However, they rarely if ever store 
beyond two years. Surplus stocks from a good harvest will typically be kept 
to around April of the second year, and then sold if the farmer is sure that the 
next harvest is good. In the present circumstances, they do not consider 
marketing to be a problem, and they are handling their larger than normal 
stocks in the following manner: 
• By paying "stick" labour with mahangu, instead of with purchased maize 
meal, as they do in deficit years 
11 
• By consuming more mahangu and purchasing less maize meal 
• By using more for brewing 
• By selling more locally in the community 
• By building up reserves for future years 
Given that mahangu is normally consumed along with purchased maize meal, 
it is easy for these farmers to regulate their use of each in relation to the 
abundance of local cereals. This applies to many, if not most, of the non-
mechanised Agribank customers, who have limited surpluses and should be 
able to dispose of them locally in small quantities at a time. They can 
probably get prices of at least N$2 per kg in this way, whereas prices for 
larger commercial sales are unlikely to exceed N$0.80 per kg, and, even if 
Government intervenes, they are unlikely to exceed the price of N$1.45 per 
kg which was set for the Drought Relief Scheme in 1996. There will however 
be some Agribank customers whose surpluses are too large to be absorbed 
locally in this way. 
There were no significant reports of insect damage and losses, and the 
mahangu we saw on farms visited appeared bright and clean. However, the 
findings in the North-Central Regions suggest that with mahangu stored for a 
year or more, significant storage losses are likely. Okashana 1 has a poor 
post-harvest reputation ("looks mouldy and goes to dust when stored for more 
than one year", "has an after-taste when machine processed", and "leaks 
water from the porridge"), but this could not be confirmed. Strangely we did 
not hear similar criticisms in North-Central Regions. 
Mechanised and some larger C1 farmers. These farmers have substantial 
surpluses which they need to sell quickly with a view to repaying their loans. 
Off-farm storage arrangements are needed on or near the main roads, in 
order: (a) to prevent insect and mould damage which is likely to occur if their 
mahangu is left in the field; (b) to facilitate quality control, inspection and 
negotiation with buyers, and; (c) allow easy access for trucks. Bulking up 
produce in this way may also help NDC and Agribank to recoup their loans. 
While these farmers have an immediate need for off-farm storage, it is not 
possible to project their long-term storage requirements because, as has 
been amply demonstrated in the NRC study, there is no clear rationale for the 
FSP which is leading them to produce large surpluses. Until it is 
demonstrated that the FSP has a clear rationale, it will be imprudent to 
propose the development of further permanent storage facilities. New 
off-farm storage facilities will only add to the costs of an unviable production 
and marketing chain - even if most of the capital costs are attributed to other 
unspecified social purposes. We discuss the marketing of commercial 
mahangu production in Appendix 4. 
Total production of the FSP farmers and other farmers financed by Agribank 
is estimated at around 7,500 tonnes, as follows: 
160 FSP producers (NDC estimate) 
2 mechanised farmers supported by Agribank 
4,000 tonnes 
500tonnes 
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371 non-mechanised farmers supported by Agribank 3,000 tonnes 
We visited three FSP producers in Katji-na-Katji, the place of greatest 
concentration of production, which is located at 90 km on the road from 
Rundu to Grootfontein. The largest producer, Moses Kamalanga, had a 
marketable surplus of 264 tonnes, which he had already been allowed to 
store in the NDC warehouse at Katji-na-Katji (total estimated capacity 1 ,250 
tonnes)2. Another producer (Bertha Nangalo) had about 50 tonnes 24 km off 
the road, mainly awaiting threshing, and in danger of spoilage through the 
effect of rain, insects and rats. She had requested roadside storage from 
NDC, and was awaiting a response. A third producer (Mr Katamba) had 20 
tonnes already threshed, and stored in huts away from the road. He was 
fearful of spoilage and wanted to store in NOG's warehouse, but claimed lack 
of funds to pay for transport. All three farmers appear willing to pay for 
storage if this is required by NDC, given the need to avoid major losses which 
will otherwise occur. 
As indicated above such storage is likely to be needed for most of the FSP 
and mechanised Agribank borrowers, and by some non-mechanised 
borrowers. The short-term need for off-farm storage arrangements in 
Kavango is estimated as follows: 
FSP producers - 80% of 4,000 tonnes 3,200 tonnes 
Mechanised Agribank borrowers - 80% of 500 tonnes 400 tonnes 
Non-mechanised Agribank borrowers -
10% of 3,000 tonnes 300 tonnes 
Total 3,900 tonnes 
i.e. about 4,000 tonnes 
Here we assume that 20% of the mechanised and 90% of the non-
mechanised production will be marketed independently, without passing 
through off-farm storage depots, or will be consumed locally. By carrying out 
its own survey, NDC can make a more accurate estimate of the storage 
requirement, and establish suitable storage locations. However our own 
preliminary investigations indicate new mahangu storage requirements 
to be as follows: 
• Short-term off-farm storage to deal with the immediate problems faced by 
FSP producers and Agribank borrowers 4,000 tonnes 
• Subject to a more in-depth assessment, assistance will be needed to 
improve on-farm storage. This should build on experience gained in North-
Central Regions, where there is the most pressing need for such 
assistance. 
2 Kamalanga was also storing for local consumption in metal tanks; this experience should 
be evaluated with a view to recommending more widely. 
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2.3.2 Sorghum and maize 
Quantities stored are quite small - provisional CSB data indicates less than 
400 tonnes for maize and less than 1 ,000 tonnes for maize, and problems 
were not mentioned by farmers visited. For sorghum, the same general 
considerations apply as in the North-Central Regions - see Section 2.4.2. 
2.4 Storage needs in North-Central Regions 
2.4.1 Mahangu 
Categorisation of farmers and general observations on requirements. RDSP 
defines farmers in the same categories as used in Kavango, there being an 
estimated 10% C1s, 30% C2s and 60% C3s. There are very few mechanised 
farmers, and most of these are primarily seed producers. There is no project 
along the lines of the FSP. 
A study by NOLIDEP in Omusati and Western Ohangwena Regions (Blanc, 
pers. comm.) indicated that only about 5% offarmers were regularly 
interested in marketing their mahangu, while some 45% were sometimes 
interested. 25% of farmers were described as being in "survival conditions" 
and had too little production to be concerned about storage problems, while 
25% of farmers were interested in storage but not in selling. 
Our own visits to farmers in these two Regions confirmed this general picture. 
A large part of the farming population (corresponding to the C3 category) 
never produces enough grain to satisfy their domestic requirements, and 
consequently has little or no storage problems. The other farmers visited 
sometimes produce surpluses, but their main objective is domestic food 
security, and selling is very much an incidental activity. Farmers seek to 
guarantee their food security by accumulating reserves, and only when these 
reserves have risen to two years consumption or more does selling become a 
serious preoccupation3. 
In normal circumstances, farmers only sell small quantities at a time, by the 
lata, to pay school-fees, hospital expenses etc .. Gifts to relatives, particularly 
from poorer areas, are also common. The old grain is consumed and sold 
before the new grain, which is stored for future needs. 
The experience of the Drought Relief Scheme gives some idea of farmers' 
over-riding concern with food security. The price paid to farmers on-farm was 
N$1.45 per kg, far in excess of the price which according to the NRC study, 
private industry might conceivably pay (N$630 to N$840 per tonne), yet only 
483 tonnes were collected, less than 1% of that year's production (51 ,900 
tonnes according to Table 2). With the bumper harvest of 1997, farmers are 
clearly prepared to sell for lower prices; indeed the Northern Namibia 
Farmers' Co-operative (NNFC) have already identified farmers wishing to sell 
3 During this visit, two years storage was the longest that was seen, though one farmer 
claimed that he would go on storing for three or more years if supplies permitted. During his 
previous visit to Namibia, Hindmarsh observed grain claimed to be stored for three years. 
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510 tonnes for N$0.80 per kg. Nevertheless this price, and the current 
market price delivered to mills in the Ondangwa-Oshakati area (N$14 per lata 
= N$0.82 per kg) is at the top end of the price range indicated in the NRC 
study. Moreover, if a major buyer were to enter the market, it might force the 
price over the N$1.00 per kg mark, rendering the processing unviable4. 
The implication of this is that when a bumper year follows years of poor to 
mediocre harvests, as happened in 1997, most of the surplus will be used for 
stock-building, and there will be only limited offtake for off-farm use. The 
need for off-farm storage will be correspondingly limited, and this can 
probably be easily provided by local trading companies (e.g. Punyu, with its 
warehouses scattered around the North-Central Regions). 
In the event of repeated large harvests such as those in 1997, the price of 
mahangu would probably fall heavily, as farmers, having already sufficient 
reserves for the year's consumption, seek to unload their surplus production. 
Given inelastic demand among local consumers, prices will quickly drop to 
levels at which it can be sold in Windhoek for animal feed; according to NRC 
the price for 1 ,000 to 2,000 tonnes might be between N$650 and N$770 per 
tonne ex-warehouse Oshakati. In this case, there will be a need for 
considerable off-farm storage for the purpose of bulking up produce in 
accessible places where it can be held prior to delivery. The storage 
requirements are likely to exceed the limited capacity that existing traders can 
provide, and there is likely to be a need for additional temporary storage 
facilities. 
Let us assume that there is a 40,000 tonne surplus in 19985, and that there 
have been off-farm sales of 5,000 tonnes since 1997. Farmers decide to 
increase their stocks by 15,000 tonnes over the level held at the 1997 
harvest. They therefore seek to sell 20,000 tonnes onto the market (40,000 -
5,000- 15,000 tonnes= 20,000 tonnes). Assuming that the storage capacity 
is used twice, with fresh stock being brought into storage as grain is shipped 
off to the user, the required storage capacity is 10,000 tonnes. 
The likelihood of two bumper harvests in succession is quite low, and it has 
not happened since records began in 1990. The largest harvest was in 1997, 
when there was a combined millet and sorghum crop of 117,1 00 tonnes. The 
next largest harvest was 65,000 tonnes in 1990, which if adjusted by 3% 
annual population growth, would be equivalent to 80,000 tonnes in 1997. 
There are three factors which could increase the level of harvests over the 
next decade however: (a) a return to more normal rainfall levels; (b) 
increasing use of short-season varieties, allowing farmers to plant a second 
time, if their first seed fails, and; (c) increasing usage of the heavily 
subsidised fertiliser provided by the Japanese. In view of these 
considerations, our best estimate is that there will be repeated bumper crop 
4 Other comments, to the effect that millers are currently able to procure mahangu at N$14 
per lata without advertising, suggest that supply is on the contrary highly price-elastic -
hence considerable quantities can be procured at this price. 
5 In reality it is unlikely that there will be a bumper crop in 1998, given the present El Nii'io 
conditions. 
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conditions leading to heavy sales at least once in ten years (at most twice), 
with smaller commercial surpluses (less than 5,000 tonnes) being available in 
anadditional two out of ten years. Assuming that stocks are turned over 
twice, the maximum storage requirement in the latter years is 2,500 tonnes. 
On-farm storage requirements. Losses for mahangu appear to be 
unusually high due to the practice of storing the grain threshed and 
retaining surpluses on farm to provide about two years' supplies. 
Since the oldest crop is eaten first, insect infestations have two years 
to develop. 
Mahangu is stored threshed in spherical, woven baskets made from 
Mopane bark and branches, and lightly mudded inside. They range 
from 250 kg baskets to 2 metre diameter structures of around 3 tonnes 
capacity. Producers begin to notice insect damage within a few weeks 
of filling the baskets. The moth, Corcyra cephalonica is the most 
significant pest causing losses which could (subject to confirmation 
through trials) be up to 10 per cent in the first year of storage, 
increasing to around 30 per cent in the second year6. These moth 
infestations result in masses of grain held together by webbing (silk) 
produced by the larvae as they move through the grain seeking a 
pupation site. Many individual grains have their embryos removed by 
the feeding larvae. In order to use the grain, they have to be rubbed 
and sieved to remove the webbing, or alternatively the masses of 
clumped grain are fed to chickens. 
This type of infestation is unusual in farm-stored mahangu, because 
producers in other countries store mahangu grain unthreshed, which is 
unattractive to the pest. Producers we visited recognised the damage and all 
were keen for a solution to the problem. By guaranteeing the physical 
integrity of their produce, they can moreover decrease the quantity stored to 
attain a given level of food security. At the same time improved on-farm 
storage will render industrial utilisation more feasible; much of the product 
currently sold is hardly of suitable quality, and might well be rejected. 
For farmers wishing to acquire new storage structures, or replace existing 
ones, the cost of Mopane baskets is itself becoming a problem, as trees are 
becoming increasingly scarce and the artisans making them are having to go 
further afield to find suitable raw materials. For structures with capacity from 
250 kg to 3 tonnes, we were informed of prices ranging from N$250 to 
N$1 ,000, i.e. a range of approximately N$333 to N$1 ,000 per tonne of 
storage capacitl. As we show in Section 4.3, it may be possible to find 
competitively-priced alternatives, which moreover provide an effective barrier 
against infestation and can be fumigated. 
6 Likewise, Wohlleber (pers. comm.), reports certain varieties of mahangu being attacked by 
storage pests other than the moth Corcyra. Dr Leuschner (ICRISAT, Bulawayo) has carried 
out relevant research. 
7 We emphasize the approximate nature of this estimate, which needs to be refined through 
further fieldwork. The shape of containers is non-uniform and volumes are difficult to 
estimate. Owners usually were usually unsure of their capacity. 
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2.4.2 Sorghum 
Sorghum is produced on a small scale in relation to mahangu. MAWRD 
figures show average production throughout the NCA areas from 1990 to 
1996 as 13.8% of the combined sorghum and millet total; preliminary CSB 
data shows the percentage for the North-Central Regions in 13.3% in 1995 
and 16.6% in 1997. Sorghum is used almost entirely for making beer. lt is 
stored threshed, in similar containers to those used for mahangu, but 
because of the low level of production, storage capacity, whether on or off-
farm, imposes no constraint. 
Threshed sorghum is susceptible to the same pest which attacks threshed 
mahangu and, in addition, is susceptible to a range of pests which attack 
other threshed grain, including maize. Red sorghum is much more vulnerable 
to attack than white varieties and threshed grain more susceptible than 
unthreshed. Consequently, storage pests seriously restrict farmers ability to 
store red sorghum, and several farmers requested assistance in addressing 
the problem. 
2.4.3 Pulses 
Farmers also store beans and cowpeas, and though these were not included 
in the terms ·of reference, it is worth noting that their storage is severely 
constrained by infestation. This problem needs to be addressed as a matter 
of priority. An interesting approach adopted by one farmer is literally to drown 
the insects. She soaks the pulses in water overnight, puts them in the sun to 
dry for three days, and then puts them in a bag or basket. lt is worth 
experimenting with this procedure. 
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In summary therefore, storage needs for in North-Central Regions are as 
follows: 
• In years of poor or average crops, sufficient on-farm storage capacity can 
be provided by the farmers themselves, and traders procuring stocks to 
satisfy the needs of deficit farmers (as described by Keyler, 1995). 
• In the event of a single bumper-crop year, following on from poor crop 
years, limited additional off-farm storage will be needed for mahangu, and 
this can probably be provided by existing trading networks. 
• In the event of a succession of bumper crop years, substantial off-farm 
storage capacity (up to 10,000 tonnes) may be needed to facilitate efficient 
marketing of surplus mahangu for industrial use. 
• New on-farm storage technologies are required to minimise quantitative 
and qualitative losses caused by insects with mahangu, sorghum and 
pulses. 
• Farmers require new cost-effective storage structures which they can 
acquire as alternatives to the traditional Mopane baskets. 
2.5 The need for Strategic Grain Reserves 
The case for Strategic Grain Reserves has already been studied in two 
previous studies, by Jones (1992) and MAWRD (1997), with generally 
negative conclusions. 
The purpose of such reserves is normally to allow Government to react 
quickly to food emergencies; they are not price support instruments for the 
benefit of producers, but are by contrast designed to assist consumers whose 
food security is under threat, since they cannot afford food on local markets. 
They are typically recommended in countries which are likely to have difficulty 
in quickly obtaining alternative supplies either through domestic purchases or 
imports- these tend to be landlocked countries with relatively fragile 
economies, and long supply routes from the international market, e.g. Mali 
and Ethiopia. These features do not characterise Namibia. lt has ready 
access to imports from South Africa, from the Americas (through Walvis Bay) 
and, in years of surplus, from landlocked countries of the interior of Africa 
(Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
Jones (1992) states that "the main justification for public national level 
reserves, if one exists, would therefore be a mechanism for reducing reliance 
on import routes which are controlled by South Africa". While hostilities or 
closure of trading relations with South Africa are, to say the least, unlikely, it is 
even less likely that the international community would allow South Africa to 
blockade Walvis Bay and Namibia's other points of entry. There seems to be 
little reason for such defence-related arguments. 
The costs of reserves are high - MAWRD estimates this at 20% of the grain 
cost, but based on international comparisons, the full cost of storing grain for 
a year in warehouses, in money terms, may be even higher. 
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATED COST OF STORING MAHANGU PER ANNUM 
In-out handling and management 
Annual storage charges - at least 
Interest on capital, say 20% 
Total 
Percentage of total grain cost 
Procurement price 
$600ftonne $1~00ftonne 
N$ 23 
N$ 60 
N$120 
N$203 
33% 
N$ 23 per tonne 
N$ 60 per tonne 
N$240 per tonne 
N$323 per tonne 
27% 
In a country where farmers hold large stocks of grain for food security 
purposes, it is they who in effect provide a reserve stocking function, at no 
cost to Government. As noted above, many NCA farmers try to hold two 
years' stocks of mahangu and only sell their reserves. For Government to 
create its own reserve will simply duplicate this activity; moroever if, as with 
the Drought Relief Scheme it subsidises the procurement price, it will 
encourage farmers and traders to destock, so that the net increase in national 
stocks (held on-farm, in the private sector, and by Government) may be 
minimal. 
A major drawback to Strategic Reserves is that they almost inevitably become 
dominated by short-term political considerations resulting in: 
(a) poor pricing and delayed buying and selling decisions, resulting in 
unnecessary financial losses to the storage agency and the public 
purse; 
(b) damage to local grain markets, as traders refrain from purchasing and 
storing (due to politically motivated interventions by the public sector), 
and farmers cease to respond to normal market signals because the 
Strategic Reserve has been used to prop up prices at uneconomic 
levels. 
The latter has happened in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. There is 
also the case of Botswana, where the Government collected large quantities 
of Sorghum as a food stock, and was then unable to sell them competitively in 
the local market (Rohrbach, pers. comm.). 
In Namibia, the effect of politically-inspired market interventions is exemplified 
by the Drought Relief Scheme of 1996. Government paid a price far in 
excess of what private buyers would have been prepared to pay, and while 
this was of immediate benefit to sellers, it provided a distorted price signal, 
encouraging some farmers to grow more mahangu in the next season, and 
creating a lobby in favour of continued Government procurement, regardless 
of the marketing prospects. If a Strategic Grain Reserve were created, the 
lobbying in favour of such procurement would be even greater. 
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In creating a Strategic Grain Reserve therefore, Namibia risks repeating 
costly mistakes made by newly independent African States in the period 1960 
to 1985, as well as some made by European countries under the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
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3. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DESIGNING 
STORAGE SOLUTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this Section, we discuss some of the more general issues raised in the 
Terms of Reference, i.e. on-farm versus off-farm storage (detailed task 3); 
the case for subsidised storage: bag versus bulk (detailed task 2); bagged 
storage options (part of detailed task 4); co-operatives (detailed task 7); the 
role of the NDC (detailed task 8). 
3.2 On-farm versus off-farm storage 
This is a matter for the market to decide. Farmers will generally store 
mahangu on farm because co-operative storage involves location-related 
difficulties and a series of institutional risks: 
Will the product be safe? 
Will I get back what I put in? 
Will my clean grain subsidise the moth-eaten grain of my neighbours? 
Will my grain be sold on credit to neighbours who never repay? 
Can I trust the treasurer (who is literate, while I am not)? 
Do I want to spend time at meetings and risk getting into acrimonious 
discussions etc.? 
Given these factors, and the prospect of reducing storage losses to negligible 
levels through better on-farm practices and structures, the benefit-cost ratio of 
off-farm versus on-farm storage for home use and sale in local markets is 
likely to be overwhelmingly negative. 
For such reasons, village storage projects often fail. This was noted by Berg 
and Kent in their study of Cereal Banks in the Sahel (1991 ), and by NRI in a 
review of the Tanzanian Village Stores project (see Coulter and Golob, 1992). 
During the 1980s, donors built about 1 ,000 village stores with 300 tonne 
capacity, but due to the collapse of the single-channel marketing system, and 
farmers' preference for on-farm storage, they were largely being used for 
other purposes - e.g. civil registries, Party offices, and as village halls. 
Farmers may organise off-farm storage on a co-operative basis, when they 
have some compelling reason, e.g. the need to have readily bagged stocks in 
a location accessible to buyers, with a view to meeting immediate orders. As 
discussed in Section 2.4.1, this may occur in the event of repeated bumper 
harvests of mahangu. In cost-benefit terms the prospective increase in sales 
revenue, which may be 20% or more, outweighs the increased risks of 
storage losses, embezzlement etc .. 
For the same reason, traders or processors may organise off-farm storage. 
As demonstrated by Keyler (1995), they may also be motivated by the 
prospect of speculative gains through seasonal storage. 
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3.3 The case for subsidised storage 
We can see no case for subsidised storage of mahangu. Subsidised inputs 
and purchasing have already brought about an increase in production, 
particularly under the FSP in Kavango, in the absence of an effective market 
to absorb the surplus thus created. Further subsidies, at the storage level, 
will tend to perpetuate the belief that Government will support mahangu 
production regardless of cost. 
Subsidised storage will moreover discourage private operators from entering 
the warehousing business, and is also likely to slow the development of Co-
operatives and similar organisations in this field - why organise one's own 
storage if one can get Government to do it? 
3.4 The case for bulk storage 
Off-farm storage of surplus production would probably be at assembly depots 
in production areas, so as to minimise transport, and beside main roads so as 
to facilitate the access of buyers and trucks. Bag or bulk handling systems 
could be used, however since bulk storage is characterised by high capital 
costs, vis a vis bag storage alternatives, it is likely to be totally uneconomic -
see worked example for maize storage in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6: CAPITAL COSTS OF BAGGED STORAGE OF MAIZE IN 
WAREHOUSES, VERSUS BULK STORAGE 
Bags in Bulk 
warehouses 
Capital cost/tonne capacity (1) N$400 N$600 
Estimated throughput of mahangu as 60% 60% 
a percentage of capacity utilisation 
(2) 
Capital cost/tonne average annual N$667 N$1,000 
throughput 
Discount factor, 10%, 20 years life 8.5 8.5 
Annualised cost/tonne throughput, N$78.4 N$117.6 
assuming cost of capital at 1 0% and 
20 years useful life 
Estimated sale price/tonne maize N$800 N$800 
Capital cost of store as percentage of 9.8% 14.7% 
sale price 
Notes: ( 1) For warehouse assume brick walled building, 18m span, 4.5 m to eves - storage 
capacity 2.0 tonnes/sq. m with maize. (2) Assuming 5 years/10 there is no surplus and 
therefore no crop to be stored, and 5 years/10 there is a surplus and stores are filled to 80% 
capacity. Average capacity utilisation = 40% x 1.5 turnovers of stock= 60%. 
Notwithstanding the very rough nature of this calculation, it shows that in a 
situation of fluctuating supply and low capacity utilisation, the cost of 
permanent off-farm storage facilities per tonne of mahangu processed will be 
very high, above all for silo facilities which can cost as much as twice as 
much as bag stores, per tonne stored. Certain of the assumptions in Table 6 
are quite favourable to bulk storage. In reality, various factors could make the 
economics of bag storage even more favourable: (a) cheaper bag stores 
could be built, with corrugated iron walls; (b) taller bag stores could be 
constructed, allowing larger quantities per square metre of storage space; (c) 
the cost of bulk storage could be higher than indicated, since sandy ground 
conditions raise the cost of civil works, and; (c) surplus conditions may occur 
in only 3 years in 10, not 5 years in 10 as assumed in Table 6. 
At the same time, bulk handling brings few compensatory savings. There are 
no savings in bag costs, since the mahangu must be shipped from the farm in 
bags, and likewise from the silo to the final user's plant (given lack of bulk 
wagons, and the opportunities for cheap backhaul using conventional trucks). 
There will consequently be double-handling as grain must first be poured into 
the silo hopper, and subsequently rebagged for dispatch to the end user. 
Typical handling charges for loading and unloading a bag store are N$7 per 
tonne (US$ 1.49), and while this is high by standards of many African 
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countries, it is small in comparison to our estimated incremental capital costs 
associated with bulk storage (about N$39.2 per tonne). 
Bulk storage is also disadvantageous in that it cannot be used for other 
purposes. Warehouses can be rented out, they can store agricultural 
implements or can even be used as village halls. In order to avoid disastrous 
losses, bulk storage requires high levels of management. By contrast bag 
storage can be locally constructed, it is flexible, requires relatively unskilled 
labour and is much easier to manage. 
The same arguments apply to mahangu, though the savings through bag 
handling would be somewhat less, due the greater bulk density of the grain 
(1.2 cu m/tonne against 1.6 cu m/tonne for maize). 
Despite these observations, there are situations in developing countries 
where bulk storage is a paying proposition, invariably where there needs to 
be a fast tu mover of grain, for example in reception silos at mills, at rail-head 
loading depots or in ports. The logic for bulk handling in such circumstances 
is that it allows one to economise on the use of other costly assets in 
conjunction with which it operates, e.g. it prevents demurrage at ports, it 
allows trains to tu m round faster. Following the same logic, a future mahangu 
miller operating on a commercial basis may seek to install silos to handle raw 
material arriving from the field. · 
3.5 Open storage versus warehouses 
Investment cost for brick walled warehouses are indicated in Table 4. At the 
other end of the spectrum is pole storage. In Zimbabwe, pole storage is 
carried out on a massive scale with single stacks of 5,000 tonne capacity, the 
cost in poles, bitumenised canvas tarpaulins etc. is approximately N$12 per 
tonne stored8. Tarpaulins are the major cost and they can be used for four 
seasons. The capital costs of Likwama's storage operation, using only 250 
tonne stacks is not surprisingly much higher (N$35 per tonne). Given that 
smaller stacks will be required, we estimate the range of feasible cost in the 
Namibian situation probably lies in the range of N$30 - N$40 per tonne. 
If the stacks are to be placed on permanent plinths instead of poles, one must 
invest approximately N$275 per sq. m, and costs rise considerably (see 
costing in Appendix 8). 
The estimated investment cost per tonne of storage capacity for maize, 
excluding perimeter fences, access roads, offices and working capital, is as 
follows: 
8 We assume minimal civil works costs, but this may vary according local conditions. 
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TABLE 7: INVESTMENT COST/TONNE CAPACITY WITH MAIZE 
Bulk storage - min. 
Warehouse - brick walls 
Warehouse - corrugated iron walls 
Open storage on permanent 
plinths - 5,000 tonne stacks 
Open storage on poles, Namibia 
Open storage on poles, Zimbabwe 
Per sq. m Per tonne 
N$800 
N$655 
N$600 
N$400 
N$328 
N$ 80 
N$ 30-40 
N$ 12 
Notwithstanding the very rough nature of this calculation, it shows the large 
differences in investment costs between the different structures. If, as is to be 
expected in Namibia, capacity utilisation is very low, the difference will be 
correspondingly greater. 
On the other hand, storage in warehouses brings several important 
advantages, including: 
• lower risk of theft or storage losses, including losses due to stackburn 
• lower recurrent costs, avoiding the need to reproof tarpaulins, and to 
replace poles and tarpaulins every four years 
• easier management 
However, cost advantages are unlikely to compensate for higher initial capital 
costs. Let us assume that storage losses can be reduced by 2% in value 
terms; there is also a saving in replacement of tarpaulins, poles etc. every 
four years. The period required to pay back the additional investment can be 
calculated as follows. 
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TABLE 8: PAY-BACK ANALYSIS FOR WAREHOUSE VERSUS POLE 
STORAGE 
(a) Savings in recurrent costs, per tonne storage capacity: 
Assume maize is worth N$800 per tonne 
Annual reduction in losses = 2% of N$800 = 
Average annual savings in replacement of 
tarpaulins, poles etc. = N$40 I 4 = 
Average annual costs = 
N$ 16 
N$ 10 
N$ 26 
(b) Increase in initial capital costs. per tonne storage capacity: 
Cost of warehouse with corrugated iron walls = N$328 
Less cost of pole storage - say = N$ 40 
Increased costs = N$288 
(c) Pay-back period, assuming 100% use of storage capacity: 
(N$328- N$40) I N$26 per year = 11 years 
lt takes 11 years to pay back the extra cost - but only in the inconceivable 
event that the facility is used to full capacity every year. Otherwise pay-back 
takes much longer. Such a pay-back periods are completely unacceptable 
under any normal investment criteria. 
Given Northern Namibia's situation of fluctuating supply, and correspondingly 
variable need for off-farm storage, the use of the cheapest technology 
(storage on poles) is likely to prove the most financially sound alternative. 
However, where there are very serious security problems, permanent 
warehouses may be preferable. 
3.6 Co-operatives 
Detailed task 7 in the terms of reference asked us to: 
Assess the financial and institutional feasibility of NCA co-operatives investing 
in storage facilities using finance obtained at Agribank interest rates. Assess 
the advantages and disadvantages of co-operatives establishing off-farm 
storage in combination with processing facilities. 
Comments on specific opportunities for farmer co-operation are made in the 
following Sections. In this section we discuss the topic in general terms. 
During our visits we encountered four co-operatives: the Likwama Farmers' 
Co-operative Union (LFCU- in Katema Mulilo); the Katemo Farmers' Co-
operative (Rundu); the Northern Namibian Farmers' Co-operative (NNFC-
Oshakati), and the OMAFA Co-op (Ohangwena). LFCU and NNFC have 
been built up on a regional basis as multi-service entities, having their own 
branch retail stores selling agricultural inputs and consumer goods. LFCU is 
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both a co-operative and a farmers' union, and much of its activity is 
concerned with lobbying Government on behalf of its members. lt is 
composed of 20 local associations which elect members to the Union board. 
NNFC has five branches. Both organisations have 400-500 paid-up 
members, and their capital consists of membership share subscriptions and 
grants, and they have no so far generated reserves from their operations. 
OMAFA is a newer creation, and is also seeking the same regional coverage. 
LFCU has a mahangu mill (dehuller and hammer-mill) working almost entirely 
on a custom basis, and NNFC (together with MAWRD) recently 
commissioned CRIAA to carry out a feasibility study with a view to 
establishing its own mahangu marketing function. NNFC's initiative has had a 
particularly fortunate outcome, in educating commercially-oriented farmers 
about the workings of the mahangu market - and giving them a greater sense 
of reality about the sort of prices which the market can bear. 
Katemo is a smaller local entity with 32 members. Its main activity is custom 
milling of maize and mahangu and it mills little more than 100 kg per month. 
Having endured a management upheaval in 1994, its financial situation 
prevents expansion of activities. 
The Namibian Co-operative movement is young, and is receiving 
considerable outside support. With a new Law passed in 1996, it is being 
promoted along classical voluntary lines, following the principles established 
by the International Co-operative Alliance, and is therefore avoiding the 
disastrous experience of many countries (e.g. Tanzania, Zambia and Eastern 
European countries) during the era of State-domination. At that time co-
operatives were widely used as instruments of Government policy, and 
incorporated into single-channel marketing systems, and the sovereignty of 
the membership was severely curtailed. 
NRI recently carried out a review of co-operatives and similar Farmer-
Controlled Enterprises (or FCEs), organised along voluntary lines since 
structural adjustment, in Africa- see Appendix 5. In relation to the Namibian 
movement, the findings suggest that there should be more emphasis on 
strong village-based organisations, rather than the regional structures which 
have so far dominated the scene. In fact we were informed that such a 
change is being sought by the Division of Co-operative Development at 
MAWRD. 
To develop a strong co-operative movement, there is a need for small 
homogeneous, village groups with clear member-driven agendas, and where 
members have frequent face-to-face interaction. They should engage in 
simple marketing or procurement activities in which they can achieve rapid 
success, and where they have a comparative advantage vis a vis other 
suppliers of these services. 
Grass-roots initiative can be stimulated if NGOs and sponsoring institutions 
invest in basic literacy, numeracy and literacy skills. Apart from this, farmers 
need to be encouraged to identify those activities which they can best carry 
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out together, and to leave to others (or contract in) those services which can 
best be carried out by private suppliers. 
Subsidies and concessional finance can weaken co-operatives, not because 
they are inherently bad, but because they tend to attract members looking for 
free resources, and not those who genuinely wish to solve their problems 
through co-operation. 
Providing they are united and well managed, co-operatives seeking to invest 
in storage face similar prospects to private traders. Indeed they may enjoy 
certain advantages due to their better knowledge of where surpluses are. As 
with private traders, oportunities for financially profitable operations will 
depend upon local circumstances. In Section 4.2 (below), we show how a co-
operative in Caprivi might make a profit by storing maize speculatively at 
"Assembly Depots". In Section 4.4, we discuss co-operative involvement in 
the periodic storage of mahangu surpluses in North-Central Regions. 
In some cases it will be financially feasible to add processing facilities to local 
storage and assembly operations, particularly custom-milling facilities which 
serve local needs. However, this is an area where FCEs are much more 
prone to failure, due to the higher management demands of jointly managing 
and maintaining complex pieces of equipment. Individual owners tend to run 
their machines longer and maintain them better than do committee-based 
organisations. 
3.7 The potential role of NDC in grain storage operations (detailed 
task 8) 
NOC has a role to play in helping to rescue this year's harvest by mechanised 
mahangu producers in Kavango Region, and ensuring that it is properly 
stored and marketed. NOG's knowledge of the business, its financial interest 
in the crop, and its ownership of various warehouses, make it a particularly 
suitable entity to carry out this role. 
Based on our observations at Katji-na-Katji and Omega (Caprivi Strip), NOC 
staff need some storage training. While stores we visited were being kept 
clean, there is scope for building better stacks, which would for allow greater 
utilisation of available space, and (by keeping the walls clear), fumigation 
under plastic sheets. 
As regards the future, we suggest that NOG's role be reviewed with a view to 
privatisation of the whole or parts of it. In reality the NCA needs some sort of 
agency to promote agricultural development, by focusing on the identification 
and exploitation of long-term development opportunities, and MAWRO is 
logically the organisation to fulfil this function. In doing this the Ministry might 
need to provide seed money for risky commercial endeavours, but only in 
situations where Government involvement is finite, and where it is clear that 
support can be withdrawn after a short period leaving the activity to survive on 
its own feet. Government should seek to work itself out of a job. 
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NDC by contrast, seems to be focused on short-term political priorities, and 
for this reason and despite the initiative of its staff, it cannot make much 
impact in the long-term. This is illustrated by its involvement in mahangu 
milling at Musese. As indicated in Appendix 4, the plant should have been 
run as a pilot operation for product development and test marketing of 
mahangu meal, particularly with a view to generating the interest of larger 
commercial players. Instead of concentrating on proving the product in this 
way, it has been run without regard to financial viability, and its very existence 
has been used as a rationale for developing commercial production in 
Kavango Region. 
In the event of NDC's privatisation, some thought should be given to how 
NDC warehouses could be best used. One possibility is the leasing of such 
buildings to specialised private storekeepers, who would work along the lines 
indicated in our discussion of maize in Caprivi. 
29 
4. PROPOSED STORAGE SOLUTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Section we seek to answer the main questions posed under detailed 
task 4 of the TOR, and propose how Namibia can address the specific 
storage needs highlighted Section 2, i.e.: 
• better storage of flood-plain maize, on and off-farm, in Caprivi (Section 
4.2); 
• improved on-farm storage of mahangu and sorghum (Section 4.3); 
• emergency off-farm storage of mahangu in Kavango, to deal with the 
immediate problems faced by FSP producers and Agribank borrowers 
(Section 4.4 ), and; 
• intermittent or occasional surges in off-farm storage requirements for 
mahangu in NCA regions, due to a succession of good harvests (Section 
4.5). 
Appendix 6 contains notes on the maintenance, operation and management 
of storage structures (detailed task 5), and also discusses means of 
minimising losses by the storage agency (detailed task 6), while Appendix 7 
provides advice on warehouse construction. 
4.2 Improving storage of flood-plain maize in Caprivi 
Recommendations are needed to protect grain from Sitotroga moth 
until threshing and Sitophilus weevils and rodents while in bags after 
threshing (see Appendix 3 for discussion of these pests)9• As margins 
are tight these recommendations need to be innovative. 
Grain should be dried and threshed as quickly as possible, to minimise 
Sitotroga damage. Pesticides such as Actellic dust can then be 
applied to the threshed grain at 0.5% by weight as the bags are being 
filled to control Sitophilus. Rodent damage can be minimised by 
stacking bags on pole platforms with metal rat guards around the 
uprights. 
The cost in such improvements can probably be recovered quickly through 
reduced storage losses and better selling prices. The cost of the simple 
structure we propose should be recovered through the decrease in rat 
damage. As regards our proposed approach for reducing insect damage, let 
us assume that: 
(a) the on-farm sales value of the maize is N$500 per tonne, and; 
(b) actellic to treat one tonne costs the farmer N$38, based on experience 
elsewhere in Africa (it is not currently on sale in Namibia). 
9 The arrival of the Larger Grain Borer (Prostephanus Truncatus) should also be forseen . 
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In this case the farmer will need a 7.6% saving in the quantity of grain lost 
and/or equivalent gains in the value of the grain sold to recover the cost of the 
insecticides. Presently, farmers stand to gain about N$200 by delivering to 
NAB's milling pool rather than to the feed-milling company, Feed master, so 
that the prospective benefit:cost ratio, assuming no additional labour costs, is 
5.3:1. 
Our conversations with flood-plain producers suggested that farmers may be 
interested in investing in metal silos - of the kind described in Section 4.3 
below. They will provide more effective protection against rats and insects, 
but it is doubtful that the benefits will justify the extra cost. Moreover grain 
stored in bags has the advantage of being in a form ready to ship to market. 
Notwithstanding, farmers may have other undisclosed reasons for preferring 
the silo (e.g. theft), so it is worth further exploring their interest in this 
alternative. 
As indicated earlier, farmers can address marketing and transport problems if 
they concentrate their produce in commercial quantities at "Assembly 
Depots". Storage may be decentralised in places like Bukalo, which are on 
permanent roads and relatively close to the flood-plain, or centralised in 
Katima Mulilo. As we indicated in Section 1.2.1, the choice between 
centralisation and decentralisation hinges on one's view as the feasibility and 
relative cost of successfully organising decentralised storage. Transport 
costs out of the flood-plain can be minimised by hiring tractors and trailers on 
a continuous basis, as a sort of logistical exercise which the farmers 
themselves organise. 
This is the sort of linkage activity in which the grass-roots FCEs, of the kind 
discussed in the previous Section, are most likely to succeed. lt is a simple 
operation, in which the individual co-operators are motivated to achieve 
practical improvements of direct benefit to themselves, and where they enjoy 
a comparative advantage over private middlemen, since they know best 
where the stocks are, and how they can best be collected. 
Linkage activities can be broken down into various functions, i.e.: 
(a) co-ordinating the transport to, and assembly of grain at, Assembly 
Depots; 
(b) receiving, controlling quality and storing the grain at Depots; 
(c) negotiating sales with NAB or private buyers, and; 
(d) organising payment to members. 
Given what we have said previously about the need for FCE's to concentrate 
on what they do best, it is worth considering exactly who is best qualified to 
carry out which of these functions. The FCE is best qualified to carry out 
Function (a) and most of (d), as this involves direct contact with the farmers 
themselves, a tiresome activity for any outside agent. The FCE might also 
control decentralised Depots, but it would probably be preferable for them to 
be controlled by a third party, i.e. a professional storekeeper. Having a third 
party as arbiter might diminish potential disputes between members over 
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quality and other matters, and he/she might possibly act as collateral 
manager vis a vis creditors, i.e. while they are waiting for the produce to be 
sold, farmers might gain access to inventory credit, based on the value of 
stock. At the same time, stock which is held by a reputable storekeeper could 
be sold forward, giving the buyer the security that the seller will perform (i.e. 
delivered) as specified in the contract. If the farmers were to manage their 
own stock both banks and buyers will probably be reluctant to consider such 
options. 
The storekeeper might be one of the storekeepers (Mr Basson, LFCU) who 
was appointed to manage stocks by NAB in procuring the 1997 maize pool, or 
another party. Such a party should be chosen purely on professional and 
financial criteria. He/she should have a first rate reputation with the trade and 
above all the banks, and be trusted by the farmers. Financial guarantees, in 
the form of assets or bonding arrangements may also facilitate the 
development of this activity. The stock should moreover be insured. 
Given that local farmers' groups will have limited access to market information 
and prospective buyers, function {c) could also be entrusted to a third party, 
on a contractual basis. Grain of a given quality could be assigned to a pool, 
and farmers paid on the basis of the average sale price realised for the pool, 
less expenses, including the seller's commission. 
We do not recommend that Government stores the grain itself, but that it 
concentrates on the training and professional development of parties 
interested in grain storage. In this regard we feel that NAB has done well by 
entrusting storage of the 1997 pool to specialised agents. 
As regards off-farm storage structures, and bearing in mind the arguments in 
Section 3.5, we would recommend starting with storage on poles, which will 
avoid overloading the cost structure of the incipient marketing operation. 
Moreover, there may be a case for Caprivi's flood-plain farmers diversifying to 
more profitable crops; until the options have been appraised one should 
avoid investing large sums in a maize-based marketing system. 
Costs should be covered by charges on users. In managing part of NAB's 
maize pool for 1997/98, LFCU is charging N$60 per tonne, and with this fee, it 
should recover its total investment in plastic covers in a single year. 
Notwithstanding this, LFCU needs to make certain changes to the way in 
which it is protecting the stacks, as a matter of some urgency- see Appendix 
8 for details. 
In order to determine whether farmers can recover their storage charges with 
an operation of this kind, one needs to carry out a full planning exercise and 
feasibility study, with the involvement of the farmers themselves. The 
operation may well prove feasible, since farmers will gain through reduced 
transport costs and through being able to negotiate with buyers from greater 
strength. Large volumes of maize of known and uniform quality, in accessible 
locations, will fetch much better prices than small scattered and unseen lots. 
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Let us make a very simple cost-benefit calculation, to show how this might 
work 10. Let us assume that the NAB-regulated procurement system is 
phased out, and that farmers are required to play the market on their own. 
After produce has been assembled at the off-farm depot, it is then stored 
there for three months before sale. The FCE succeeds in reducing transport 
costs by N$20 per tonne, and increases the selling price by $250 per tonne, 
from N$500 to N$750. The cost of capital invested in the stored crop is 
assumed to be 5% for the three month period. The benefit-cost ratio is 
calculated as follows: 
TABLE 9: HYPOTHETICAL COST-BENEFIT CALCULATION FOR AN 
IMPROVED MAIZE HANDLING AND STORAGE OPERATION IN 
CAPRIVI FLOOD-PLAIN AREA 
Per tonne of maize 
Benefits: Additional revenue 
Transport savings 
Total 
Incremental costs: 
Storage insecticide (for on-farm use) 
Off-farm storage charges 
Interest for 3 months - 5% of N$500 
FCE's management charges 
Sales commission (2% of N$700) 
Total 
Incremental revenue to farmer 
Benefit:cost ratio = 270/157 = 
N$250 
N$ 20 
N$270 
N$ 38 
N$ 60 
N$ 25 
N$ 20 
N$ 14 
N$157 
N$113 
1.72 
4.3 Improving on-farm storage of mahangu and sorghum 
As far as we know the Corcyra moth does not come from the field but enters 
the mahangu when it is in storage. If this is the case, there will be no need 
for insecticide and the solution to the problem is to place it in a sealed 
container which the moth cannot enter. One way in which this might be done 
is to continue using the traditional baskets, and to line them with thick plastic 
sheeting. The cost would be minimal (i.e. less than N$20 per basket), and 
providing it works in the way intended, is likely to be highly acceptable to 
farmers. 
10 Some of the assumptions here are somewhat "heroic", but in making this calculation we 
seek to specifically answer "detailed task 7" in the terms of reference. The client should use 
Table 9 as a checklist in carrying out a full feasibility study. 
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With little hesitation, most farmers said they would pay N$20 per basket if 
they could protect it in this way - a sum which would easily cover the cost of 
the plastic which would last for several years. They would recover their 
investment very fast. Let us assume, conservatively a 6% quantitative saving 
of their mahangu which is presently being lost. If each basket holds 1 tonne 
of mahangu, they would save 60 kg per year. Assuming a value of $0.90 per 
kg, the value of this saving would be $54 per basket used per year. The 
plastic is paid for several times in the first year it is used. 
Where farmers need to increase their storage capacity, or where their baskets 
are no longer serviceable, one should examine the scope for entirely new 
storage structures. Various alternatives can be considered, including bins 
made from galvanised iron, modified water-tanks, fibreglass and plastic 
containers. 
Galvanised iron bins have proved viable for on-farm grain storage around the 
World, including India, Pakistan, Central America and Swaziland. The 
viability of the technology has been demonstrated by high and increasing 
levels of adoption, with small farmers generally paying the full cost, or nearly 
the fully cost, of the bin. In Central America, farmers are paying around 
US$60 (N$282) with capacity of 0.8 tonnes of maize - equivalent 1.07 tonnes 
mahangu, due to the greater density of this grain. The cost may be higher in 
Nambia, due to high raw material costs, higher transport costs, taxes and 
labour, but it is unlikely to cost more than about US$100 (N$470)1\ a price 
which is competitive with baskets of comparable size, and it would provide 
better protection for the grain. Grain can be fumigated, an important 
advantage if it is found that the moths enter the grain from the field, and 
cannot therefore be restrained by lining traditional baskets with plastic. 
While the raw material has to be imported, these bins can be made by local 
tinsmiths, thereby generating a local industry. The tinsmith himself becomes 
a small businessman, selling the idea to local farmers, procuring raw 
materials and travelling to the villages to make the bins in situ. With the 
waste materials, he would make watering cans, buckets etc .. 
Certain issues will need to be studied in order to assess the viability of the 
bins under Namibian circumstances: 
(a) Quality control. Bins should be made to strict quality norms, with 
regard to the raw material used, the cutting of material, soldering of 
joints etc. -this ensures the reputation of the product and encourages 
adoption by farmers. Central American experience indicates that 
effective quality control requires that artisans are properly trained, and 
that the bins they produce be regularly inspected. This is an additional 
project cost, presumably to be borne by the public purse. 
11 This higher figure is based on a Namibian quote we obtained for 1850 x 925 x 0.5 mm DIN 
standard material of South African origin, and which proved to be over twice as expensive as 
similar 0.45 mm guage material currently used in Nicaragua. Even taking account of transport 
costs, taxes and the thickness of the material, the difference is difficult to explain. Further 
investigation is needed with a view to identifying cheaper sources. 
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(b) The need to protect them from moisture and therefore corrosion. They 
have to be raised off the floor by a flat base of sawn-timber, concrete 
or other material. They need a roof, but thatched shelters may not 
prove sufficiently waterproof. 
(c) Household removals. Farmers in North-Central Regions move home 
every five years or so - literally lifting up their palisade-dwellings and 
setting them down nearby. Attempts to remove loaded bins will 
probably damage them. 
Indeed the bins would need to be thoroughly tested in an entirely new cultural 
context to those where they have proved so successful. 
Plastic containers are already being used by some farmers in the North-
Central Regions, and may be considered for wider adoption. However, our 
initial enquiries suggest that they could only be competitive at very large sizes 
- retail prices are around N$494 per 2,500 litre capacity FOB Okahandja and 
N$822 for a 1 ,000 litre for a 2,500 litre container- equivalent to about N$600 
to N$1 ,000 per tonne of mahangu. One advantage vis a vis galvanised iron 
bins is that there would be no need to train tinsmiths and organise quality 
control. 
35 
TABLE 10: ESTIMATED CAPITAL COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVE 
ON-FARM STORAGE STRUCTURES 
Structure Estimated Observations 
capital cost/ 
tonne of 
mahangu 
stored (N$) 
Traditional Mopane 333- 1,000 life about 1 0 years; unsealable and 
basket unfumigable; raw material growing 
scarcer 
Galvanised iron bins 439 price for 1.07 tonne silo; life 1 0 to 15 
years; additional public sector costs in 
training artisans & quality control 
Plastic tanks 600 - 1,000 retail prices for 2,500 and 1,000 litre 
capacity tank, excluding freight from 
Okahandja to NCA 
* excluding complementary structures such as stands or supports, roofing and shade 
A programme of investigation and trials is recommended to test alternative 
storage technologies of the kind described above. If they prove successful, 
they can be demonstrated to farmers, and hopefully, this will lead to large-
scale adoption. Government's input will be in the area of R&D, extension, 
quality control, monitoring adoption and trouble shooting- the seed 
processing facility at Mahenene might be a suitable centre for this activity -
and has already indicated interest. 
All other inputs should come from the farmers themselves, who will buy the 
new materials or structures in local shops or, in the case of metal bins, 
contract for their supply with local tinsmiths, much as they do now with the 
Mopane baskets. To maximise adoption, we suggest that subsidisation of 
these inputs should be avoided, since it will discourage the emergence of 
private service suppliers. One should try to develop local storage solutions 
which spread spontaneously, with Government (or NGOs) only supplying 
technical support. 
Improved local storage of grain surpluses is likely to have a very positive 
impact on food security among the poorest groups. While they will not 
necessarily acquire the new technology, as they have little produce to store, 
there will be more grain available locally to buy or borrow from neighbours 
who do store. Groups of farmers interviewed in a Swiss-funded evaluation of 
the Central American grain storage project indicated that this had proved to 
be a major benefit. 
36 
I 
I 
I 
i 
With sorghum, the best way to address farmers' much voiced concerns is 
probably to store it on the head. At the household level and with traditional, 
unimproved varieties, sorghum can be readily stored in this way for a year, 
with minimal damage - as is done throughout West Africa - though there will 
be some cost in terms of the larger storage structures. The alternatives are 
to treat the sorghum with Actellic or some other suitable insecticide, or storing 
and fumigating it in a sealed container. We are reluctant to recommend 
storage insecticides, given lack of knowledge of the long-term effects of their 
usage, the possibility that their use will be banned in Europe and ultimately in 
Africa as well, and the existence of an alternative technology, i.e. storing on 
the head. 
4.4 Emergency off-farm storage of mahangu in Kavango 
In Section 2.3.1, we estimated the storage requirement at 4,000 tonnes. The 
following options exist: 
(a) Use existing Government capacity 
Ministry of Works (MoW) and NDC are the principal owners of 
warehousing capacity in Rundu, but MoW warehouses are currently 
rented out. At Katji-na-Katji, NDC has a shed with corrugated iron 
walls and roof, capable of storing 1 ,250 tonnes. The dimensions of the 
main building are 27 x 14 x 3.5m, and there is a lean-to of 27 x 4 x 
3m. The shed is currently used by one farmer storing approximately 
264 tonnes which is badly stacked (with low stacking against walls, no 
plastic sheeting dunnage) and occupying half the store. If bags are re-
stacked, then most of the Katji-na-Katji production surplus could 
probably be held in this one store as an interim measure. 
NDC also has a storage facility in Omega (Caprivi Strip) and this is 
already being used to store the produce of local farmers. We made 
similar observations to the local manager about storage arrangements 
to those made in regard to the Katji-na-Katji store. 
(b) Open storage on poles 
Where Government land is available, an option would be to use open 
storage on plinths or pole dunnage under (at least part) canvas 
sheeting. Based on LFCU costs quoted above, and taking account of 
the greater density of mahangu vis a vis maize, the initial investment in 
covers, poles etc. would be about N$28 per tonne. The cost for 2,500 
tonnes of mahangu would be about N$70,000. 
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(c) Rent existing private sector capacity 
Private sector storage capacity is at a premium in all the NCA Regions, 
because of rapidly increasing business opportunities and the 
expectation, in some parts, of increasing trade with Angola. We were 
informed that no suitable facilities are available in Rundu (or in 
Oshakati), but the firm SAKKA Electric offers to construct warehouses 
with brick walls on their own land and rent out at N$ 11 /m2 /month, 
increasing by 10% per annum. In order to build it would probably 
require a two year rental contract. SAKKA says construction could 
take place immediately and claims that warehouses would be ready for 
use in six weeks. 
A two year contract for rental of a 1,000 sq. m warehouse, sufficient to 
store 2,500 tonnes, would therefore cost N$132,000 + N$145,200 = 
N$277,200. 
(d) Build a new warehouse 
SAKKA also offers to construct 18m span warehouses of any length for 
approximately N$ 700 to 800 1m2. A 1 ,000 m2 warehouse with walls 
of 4.5 m to the eaves could be used to accommodate 2,500 tonnes of 
mahangu, with grain stacked 18 bags high, and it would cost about N$ 
750,000. A cheaper structure could be built using metal walls. In 
Oshakati we were quoted approximately N$ 655/m2 for 1 0 m span 
sheds with metal cladding and concrete floor with a loading of 3.5 
tonnes 1m2. However, metal cladding would be susceptible to buckling 
through falling stacks - probably not a good idea if Government is 
seeking a permanent structure. 
The above costs do not take account of land acquisition, access roads, 
fences or perimeter walls, or any management or engineering services, but 
they nevertheless permit a rough comparison of the options. 
Clearly the best and relatively cost-free option is to use existing Government 
buildings, where they are available and not required for other purposes, but 
this will only allow for storage of part of the grain. The rest would probably 
need to be stored in or close to Rundu, with a view to collecting surpluses to 
the East and West. Given uncertainties about the future of commercial 
mahangu production, the least desirable option is to build a new warehouse. 
Open storage on poles is the cheapest option, and has the major advantage 
of time, since it can start immediately. The rental agreement with SAKKA 
would be advantageous in terms of security, which may be a problem in an 
urban area. While the rental cost for storing 2,500 tonnes is considerable, i.e. 
N$277,200, compared to $70,000 investment cost for open storage, it might 
be diminished by sub-letting the building in the second year. 
Due to the time factor we recommend pole storage. 
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NDC is the main party interested in ensuring the physical security of mahangu 
financed with loans, so we recommend it takes care of the storage operation. 
The grain will be property of the borrowers, but assuming they are in debt to 
NDC and Agribank, these two parties can take a lien on the stock. As a 
condition for refinancing outstanding loans they may also require that 
borrowers deposit remaining stock with NDC and assign the lenders the right 
to sell the grain as it sees fit with a view to ensuring repayment. Depositors 
should be charged for storage at a commercial rate, with a view to setting a 
precedent which will prove attractive to private operators. 
We also suggest Katemo Co-op. participate in the organisation of storage, on 
behalf of its own members. 
4.5 Handling periodic surges of mahangu supplies 
Similar arrangements are recommended for storing these occasional surges, 
firstly to make use of any existing Government or private storage capacity 
which can be rented, and secondly to store on poles on Government or 
rented land. 
Storage management should be carried out by competent private parties. 
These may be processors interested in procuring mahangu for their own use, 
FCEs seeking to market members' mahangu, or specialised storage agents 
who fit the requirements we listed in the discussion of maize in Caprivi. In 
line with our earlier discussion, we recommend FCEs organise primarily on a 
local basis - co-operative marketing should be an initiative undertaken by 
committed neighbours with a specific business objective in mind. 
lt should be feasible for co-operatives to invest in storage under such 
circumstances. In cost-benefit terms, let us assume it costs N$60 per tonne 
to store the mahangu on poles, including both fixed and working capital costs 
(as budgeted by LFCU). If we assume an on-farm market price of N$600 per 
tonne, it should be easy to obtain a premium of 10% or more, simply by 
bringing the grain together in a location which is accessible to major buyers, 
e.g. feed-millers from Windhoek. Such buyers will not wish to go round farms 
picking up a few bags. 
As with maize in Caprivi, we do not recommend Government involvement in 
storage of mahangu, though Government support may be needed in 
procuring expensive equipment (tarpaulins, fumigation sheets etc.), which 
could be leased to private operators. Apart from that we recommend that 
Government concentrates on training of interested parties. 
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5. THE PROSPECTIVE IMPACT OF A FUTURE SADC 
FREE MARKET ON THE RECOMMENDED 
OPTIONS {DETAILED TASK 9} 
A SADC free market will result in generally lower, and more unstable prices 
for maize and maize meal. Price instability results principally from the 
periodic movement of Southern Africa between a surplus and deficit situation, 
and consequently from export parity to import parity pricing scenarios. 
Underlying the recommendations in this report has been a concern to make 
farmers more self-reliant and able to survive in a changing environment. 
Hence we have recommended training of farmers in basic skills, farmer co-
operation in addressing local needs, improved on-farm storage, and low-cost 
and hence sustainable off-farm storage systems. 
A SADC free market does not affect our recommendations. We have already 
taken account of NRC findings concerning the viability of high-input 
production of mahangu. Lower maize prices will further depress the viability 
of this activity. 
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A~""NEXURE A 
TERviS 0 F R.EFERE:.\'" CE 
CONSULTA;.l"CY ON GR-\IN STOR-\GE F.-\CILITIES IN NORTRE&.'f 
COlY.li'riUNAL NA~IIBL-\ 
1. Background 
Grains are the main staple food of the majority of Narnibians. Domestic grain production is 
principally rainfed and varies sharply from ye3!-to-ye:lf depending on the level and timing of 
rainfalL In a good g:ro'Ning year, roughly two-thirds of the grain needed to meet human dema.'l.d 
is grown domestically. In a poor growing ye3!, this ratio falls to under one-third. Pearl millet 
(mahangu) is the moSL irnponam grain in terms of domestic production, accounting for more than 
one half of national grain output in all ye3!s and for well over one half in some ye3!s. Between 
1991/92 and 1995/96, national mahangu production varied from 15,000 tons to 59,000 tons. 
Output in the current 1996/97 production year is forecast to be a record, in excess of 100,000 
tons. 
Weil over half ofNa.-rnibia's total papulation live in the northern communal areas (NCA). These 
areas accou.'1t far almost the emire national output ofmahangu. In the populous North/Central 
Regions and in Kavango Region, mahangu is the main grain and is produced by virtually all 
fa."TTlers. In Caprivi Region, climatic conditions are suited to maize, and in most years a greater 
volume of maize is produced than mahangu. In all three areas, sorghum is also grown. In 
Narribia's commercial areas, maize is the only important grain crop. This is produced principally 
under rainfed conditions in the ·maize triangle' in the Otavi, Tsumeb, Grootfontein area. A small 
amount of wheat is also grown in the commercial areas under irrigation. Since 1991192, total 
grain production in the communal areas has exceeded that in the commercial areas by a factor of 
from 2 to 5. 
\Vithin Namibia as a whale, white maize accounts for about one half of the total quantity of grain 
consumed directly by the population. The remaining grain consumption comprises principally 
mahangu and wheat. Wheat consumption, although following a rising trend, is relatively stable 
from year to year, whereas mahangu consumption varies sharply with the level of domestic 
production. National mahangu consumption exceeds national wheat consumption in years of high 
mahangu output, but falls to below it in years of drought. 
Mahangu is the preferred staple in North/Central and Kavango Regions. Most mahangu and 
sorghum produced in these regions is grown on small farms for subsistence. In Kavanga Region, 
additional amounts are produced on Namibia Development Corporation (N'"DC) farms and under 
the Farmer Support Programme (FSP). In poor growing years, most farm households produce 
insufficient mahangu to meet their needs. In such years, the marketed surplus is largely limited 
to NDC/FSP production and the surpluses of a small number oflarger farmers. In good gro"Wing 
years, 'NTIC/FSP prcduction increases and a greater number of farm households produce surpluses 
over and above their annual consumption. Traditionally, farm households store surpluses in goad 
years to meet deficits in poor years. Thus, off-farm mahangu sales currently are restricted largely 
to a small number of lar£er fanns and to distress sales bv small farm households in ument need 
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., Objectives 
The study will cover the storage of mahangu, maize and sorghum only and will focus mainly on 
seJ.Sonal and inter-year storage. 
The main objective of the study is to make recommendations on appropriate types, ownership, 
management and capacities of off-farm grain storage in the NCA Specifically, the consultants 
will determine the most appropriate: 
(a) total storage capacity 
(b) location(s) ofthe storage 
(c) type(s) of storage 
(d) type(s) of grain to be stored 
(e) o~.vnership ofthe storage 
(f) ownership of the stored grain 
(g) physical management (fumigation, rotation, etc.) 
(h) price formation and payment systems for the stored grain 
(i) financial and economic costs and benefits 
G) corn....11ercial _and concessional sources of financing 
An additional objective of the study is to assess the need for holding strategic grain reserves in 
Namibia, and to assess the costs and benefits which would derive from such reserves. 
3. Demiled Tasks 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Project the monthly total (including on-farm) grain storage requirement for mahangu, 
sorghum and maize in each NCA region taking account of the storage objectives of farm 
households. Make separate projections for a run of good growing years, a run of poor 
grov.ing years, and selected sequences of good and bad years. 
Project and compare the costs and benefits of off-farm storage (a) in bulk in silos and (b) 
in bags in storage halls. Cost projections should include the costs of construction, 
maintenance, operation, management and finance. 
For selected farm sizes, compare the net benefits to farmers of storing on farm with the 
most efficient means of off-farm storage. Recommend whether Government resources 
devoted to developing grain storage should .be focussed on improving on-farm storage or 
on developing off-farm storage. Differentiate these recommendations, as necessar·y, 
between crops, between regions, and between farm sizes. 
For-off-farm storage, using the findings under 1-3, above, develop recommendations for: 
the optimal size and location of storage facilities; 
appropriate ownership and management of these facilities; 
appropriate ownership of the grain stored; 
operational procedures for buying and selling; 
operational procedures for recovering storage costs and for paying for, or 
. . c. 
returrung, gram to .armers. 
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5. Consider the desirability of public subsidisation of off-farm storage, taking ac::ount, inter 
alia, of its impact on the deve!opme::lt of private warehousing. 
6. Recomme::1d means of minimising the possibility of losses by the storage agency, and 
assess the likelihood of losses being incurred. 
7. Assess the financial feasibility ofNCA cooperatives investing in storage facilities using 
finance obtained at Agribank interest rates. Assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
cooperatives establishing off-farm storag: in combination with processing facilities. 
8. Comme::1t on the potential role of~"DC in grain storage in the NCA. 
9. Comment on the impact of a future SADC free market on the recommended options. 
10. Assess the need for holding strategic ~ain reserves in Na.rni.bia, the costs and benefits 
which would derive from such reserves, and the impact of such resources on national and 
household food security. 
ll . Throughout the consultancy, draw on the experience of other sub-Sa..l-:!aran countries. 
4. Auspices, Funding and Management 
l. The consultancy will be undertaken through the Narnibian Agronomic Board (NAB) to 
make use ofits experience of maize production, processing and marketing in Caprivi and 
its experience gained in managing the Mahangu Marketing Intelligence Unit (Mj.VfiU). 
2. The consultancy will be funded under t..~e MA WRD Capital Development Project 
"Maha."'lgu Processing" . The N1A WRD will pay the NAB an invoiced lump sum. 
3. A Steering Committee for the work will be appointed, comprising: 
A 
"T , 
5. 
the General Manager of the Narnibian Agronomic Board 
staff of the Cooperative Division of the Directorate of Planning (DoP) 
staff of the Marketing, Statistics and Policy and Planning Sub-Divisions of 
the DoP. . 
representative of the NN"'FU 
The consultants will meet the Steering Committee at the start of the study, and liaise with 
individual committee members during the study, as appropriate. 
Staffing 
The consulting team will comprise an economist who will act as Team Leader (25 working days) 
and a technical storage specialist ( l 0 working days). Both consultants should have extensive 
experience of similar work in other Sub-Saharan countries, including experience of work in at 
least one other country in which millet or sorghum is a major staple crop. The Team Leader 
should be experienced, in particular, in addressing issues relating to communal and cooperative 
~ 
.J 
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' 
storage. He/she should also be skilled in quantitative market analysis. The storage specialist 
should have in-depth knowledge of on-farm and small-scale off-fann storage of millet, sorghum 
and maize. 
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MINlJTES OF STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING: CONSU"LTANCY ON 
GRAIN STORAGE FAcn.ITlES 
DATE: September 16/1997 
VEJ."'1UE: 30 Hochland Road 
TIME: 09:00 
1.0 CONS111'U'I10N OF MEETING 
. . 
The Chairman welcomed all members to the Steering Committee. A special word of 
welcome was extended to the consultant Mr J Coulter from Natural Resources 
International. 
2.0 ATTENDANCE 
Mr JAH Hoffinann 
MrCBrock 
MrJCoutler 
Mr M f.l:ishekwa 
MsHRakow 
Ms M Mupotola 
MrZUazenga 
MsAVenter 
Dr M Westlake 
3.0 APOLOGIES 
MsPAkwenye 
MrMFowler 
Namibian Agronomic Board (Chainnan) 
Cooperative Division: DOP 
Naturnl Resources International 
Marketing Sub-Division: DOP 
Statistics Sub-Division: DOP 
Marketing Sub-Division; DOP 
Namibia National Farmers Union 
Namibian Agronomic Board 
Consultant! Advisor: DOP 
4.0 "MA TIERS FOR DISCUSSION 
4.1 Discussion and amendments to the Terms ofReferen,ce ofthe consultancy. 
The Terms of Reference were discussed and the following amenchnents and 
additions were agreed upon: 
1. Background 
No amendmeqts were made with regard to the background of the study as set out 
inpointl. 
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2. Objectives 
• It was noted that on-farm as well as off-fium storage 'Will be addressed; 
• This is a baseline study which will assess the~ of grain storage (on-farm 
and off-filnn} either commercialized or as a subsidized facility with an 
alternative (socio-economic) purpose. 
• The economic. financial and institutional viability of off-farm storage will be 
addressed. 
3. Detailed tasla 
The fOllowing were amended under this point: 
I. This point was amended to read: "Estimate total (including on-farm grain 
storage) mahangu, maize and sorghum expected to be stored in each NCA-
region takiDg account of the storage objectives of farm households. 
Indicate how storage requirements vazy during the year. Make separate 
projections for a nm of good growing years. a run of poor growing years 
and selected sequences of good and bad years." 
2. Not amended. It was noted that point 2 should be compared to point 3. 
3. This point was slightly amended as follows: ~or Selected fimn sizes, taking 
account of institutional and financial viability, compare the net benefits of 
storing on-farm ........ . . .. ... . ...... . .. " 
It was noted that the long term viability of off-fit.nn storage largely depends 
on the creation of regular markets as well as the success of the milling 
industry and quality of the processed product. 
4. The Steering Committee agreed that although the consultant will explore 
various options vvith its pro's and con's, it was noted -that the- consultant 
will detemaine the viability of various options and strategies and detailed 
assessments will only be done on those tbat proof to be viable. A cost 
benefit will be done on all options before deciding whether such options are 
viable. The consultant will only make recommendations according to his 
professional judgement with regaro to institutional, economical and 
financial viability as well as alteroative options for socio-economic benefit. 
Internal supply stabilization will be addressed in annual and bi-annual off as 
well as on-faml storage within a bad production year. 
5. A statement in the consultant's report 'Will cover this point. 
!+-?? 
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6. This point was amended to read: "Recommend the means of minimizing the 
possibility of financial and physical losses by the storage agency, and assess 
the 1ik:e1ihood of losses being incurred. It was agreed that the on-fann 
storage in the Caprivi flood plains be addressed as serious losses 'Wei'e 
experienced recently ... 
7. This point was amended to read: "Assess the financial and institutional 
feasibility of NCA cooperatives investing in storage facilities using finance 
.. 
8. Point 8 was not amended. 
9. This point was amended to read: "Comment on the impact of a future 
SADC free market on the recommended options especially in the Caprivi 
area as well as the poSSible influx of mahangu into the NCA. •• 
10. This point was slightly amended to read: "Assess the need for holding 
strategic grain reserves (food security) in Namibia, the costs and benefits 
which would derive from such reserves ..... " 
11. This point was amended to read: "Throughout the consultancy, draw on 
the experience of other sub-Sabaran countries such as inta- alia Mali and 
Botswana which more or less experience similar conditions as in Namibia.·· 
4. 
No amendments were made to tbis point. 
S. Staftiag 
No amendments were made to this point. 
4.2 Determination of applicable dates: 
Tbe following dates were agreed upon: 
• Commencement date of study: September 1611997. 
• Date of completion ofstwiy: Od.ober 1711997. 
• Date of submission of dntft :final report to the Steering Committee: October 
17/1997. 
• Date of discussion of the final draft repon by the Steering Committee: October 
2?11997. 
• Date of discussion of the final ch'aft report the by the Steering Committee and 
the ConsWtant October 23/1997. 
• Submission of final report: October 31/1997. 
4.3 AnY other points ofdiscussion 
None. 
5.0 CLOSURE 
4'7 
The meeting adjourned at 11:55. 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PERSONS MET OR CONSULTED 
Name 
In Windhoek 
Jurgen Hoffmann 
Christoph Brock 
Jurgen von Muralt 
Sageus Kintinu 
Sheuyange Asser 
Martin Fowler 
Michael Westlake 
Miss Ndeulita 
Mr Jackobsen 
Johannes Mesfin 
Helena Rakow 
Moono Mupotola-Sibongo 
M. Hishekwa 
Trevor Uprichard 
Mr Kebe 
Michel Mallet 
Rod Davis 
Dr Andrew Sargeant 
Kavango Region 
Peter Horn 
Barry Weightman 
Reino Asindi 
Boetie Snyman 
Sikongo Haihambo 
Vincent Likoro 
Tinus de Vries 
Mr Pereira 
Nambase Eliah 
Julius Hambuyuca 
Pinehas Mukundu 
Monica Koshile 
Harriet Matsaert 
Hugh Bagnaii-Oakeley 
Farmers 
Mrs Kamalanga and sons 
Bertha Nangalo 
Mr Katamba 
Caprivi Region 
Wilhelmina Shilongo 
Mr Sibolile 
Fred Liseho 
Chief Admin. Officer 
Shiraz Bhamjee 
Mr Machenga and other 
farmers 
North-Eastern 
Position 
Manager, NAB 
Deputy Director: Co-operatives; Registrar of Co-operatives, 
MAWRD 
Management and Training Adviser, Co-op Support Services 
Project, MAWRD 
Early Warning System, MAWRD 
Early Warning System, MAWRD 
EU Adviser, Policy & Planning Sub-Division, Directorate of 
Planning, MAWRD 
EU Adviser, Marketing Sub-Division, Directorate of Planning, 
MAWRD 
Head of Food Security and Nutrition Unit, MWARD 
Monitoring and Evaluation, MWARD 
FAO Food Security Adviser, MWARD 
Statistician, MWARD 
Head of Marketing Sub-Division, MAWRD 
Marketing Sub-Division, MAWRD 
Agriculturalist/Extension Specialist, RDSP, Katima Mulilo 
CSB 
Exec. Director, SA-DC 
NRC 
NRC 
Deputy Director, N-E Region, MAWRD 
Project Manager, RDSP, Rundu 
MAWRD, Rundu 
Branch Manager, Agribank, Rundu 
NDC Regional Rep., Kavango 
FSP Manager, NDC, Rundu 
Manager, NDC Centre, Musese 
SAKKA Engineering, Rundu 
Co-ordinator, Kavango Regional Farmers' Union 
Manager, Katemo Farmers' Co-op. 
Researcher, KSFR!E 
Researcher, KSFRIE 
Social Anthropologist, KSFRIE 
KSFRIE, Mashare 
Shikoro village 
Katji-na-Katji 
Katji-na-Katji 
Katji-na-Katji 
Manager, OMEGA Agricultural Project, Caprivi 
MWARD, Katima Mulilo 
Caprivi Regional Representative, NAB 
LFCU, Katima Mulilo 
Kamunu Mills, Katima Mulilo 
Zobue, Kabbe Area, Caprivi Flood-Plain 
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Regions 
Mr lmalwa 
Didier Helmstetter 
Vicky N. lipinge 
N. N. lmmanuel 
W. R. Lechner 
Ephraim H. Weyulu 
Jack Matanyaire 
Francois Blanc 
Paully lipinge 
Kalifeni Shatona 
T. S. Nepunisa 
Julius Ambondo 
Fillemon Amukoto 
Monika Moses 
Arne Larsen 
Mrs Botha 
The Manager 
Winsel Potgieter 
Elizabeth Shivute 
Small Mahangu Miller 
Emundile Martin 
Various farmers 
Mr Ndjimba and other 
farmers 
Angela Rautia and other 
farmers 
Reverend lita 
Okahandja 
Johannes Cloete 
Johan Muller 
Henry Valentine 
Dr David Dendy 
David Rohrbach 
Other 
Deputy Director, NE Regions, MWARD 
Co-ordinator, NNRDP, Ongwediva 
Acting CAEO, MAWRD, Ongwediva 
AEO, Ongwediva 
CAEO - crops, Mahenene 
CAET, Oshakati 
RSDP, Oshakati 
Reg. Co-ordinator, NOLIDEP, Oshakati 
MMIU, Oshakati 
MMIU, Oshakati 
OMAFA Farmers' Co-op., Ohangwena 
CAET, Oshakati 
CAET, Ombalanto 
AET, Uukwaluudhi 
DCA, Oshakati 
Intercontinental Supermarkets, Oshakati 
Punyo Wholesalers, Ondangua 
Maintenance Engineer, ELUWA Wholsesalers, Oshakati 
Clerk, Continental Wholesalers, Oshakati 
Ondangua 
Chief Extension Officer, Ohangwena Region 
East Ohangwena Region 
lpembe, Ohangwena Region 
Tsandi, Omusati Region 
NNFC, Ongwediva 
Manager, Profiling Plant, NEC, Okahandja 
Managing Director, Nutrifood, Okahandja 
Namibia Rotomould (Pty) Ltd 
Grains After Harvest, Oxford, UK 
ICRISAT, Bulawayo 
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APPENDIX 3: ON-FARM STORAGE OF MAIZE BY FLOOD-PLAIN 
FARMERS IN CAPRIVI REGION 
The following observations are based on a visit to a farm at Zobue, which is 
on the flood-plain about 20 km north-east from the village of Kebbe. Two 
other local farmers also joined the discussions. 
Flood-plain planting takes place from August to October on the receding 
flood, and is harvested from January to April, but the area is flooded from 
April when families leave for higher ground. One or more family members 
stay on the island to guard and thresh the crop through to September. They 
try to remove some of the bagged maize by boat, but most leaves by lorry 
when the flood recedes in October. This means late marketing which was a 
major disadvantage this year (1997). 
Maize becomes heavily infested with the moth Sitotroga for the 7 to 1 0 
months while it is held on the islands in the flood plain. This is due to the 
practice of holding de-husked cobs in large basket weave bins for drying. 
This moth does not attack threshed maize, since it cannot move easily 
through a grain bulk. Threshed grain is more commonly infested with the 
weevil, Sitophi/us, although little evidence of this infestation was seen in the 
threshed, bagged maize on the islands at the time of our visit. 
Farmers were trying very hard to deliver good quality by selecting only good 
cobs for threshing, and were willing to apply control measures. We noted 
stalk borer and mould damage (Fusarium) on rejected cobs. Threshing is 
done using sticks, and breakage was low indicating careful threshing. 
Grain is stored in polypropylene bags under a thatched shelter until collected. 
Heavy losses due to rodents were reported, but this could not be confirmed. 
Overall weight losses due to insects are unlikely to exceed 1% between 
harvest and bagging the threshed grain, but without taking account of cobs 
which are rejected prior to threshing. While the main reason for rejection was 
cob rot caused by Fusarium, an unknown percentage was rejected on 
account of moth infestation. 
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APPENDIX 4: THE MARKETING OF COMMERCIAL MAHANGU 
PRODUCTION IN NAMIBIA 
This subject has been investigated by Namibia Resource Consultants (NRC) 
as part of their study of the Mahangu Market Intelligence Unit (MMIU); we 
have kept close contact with the NRC study, and given the importance of the 
subject in deciding on storage policy, have ourselves carried out some 
interviews in the area. 
A key issue in the marketing of mahangu outside of the NCA is: (a) whether it 
has to be sold as a commodity, with price being set on the basis of its weight 
and content in terms of protein, carbohydrates etc., or; (b) whether it can be 
marketed at a premium on account of taste preference, specific functional 
properties of use in food manufacture (e.g. of weaning foods), perceived 
health-giving attributes, brand loyalty or any other factor which distinguishes it 
from competing cereals, particularly white maize. 
Mahangu meal has been sold by NDC since 1994, but this scarcely 
documented experience does not adequately answer this question. There is 
consequently much uncertainty about the following subjects: 
• The potential size of the market for mahangu meal: Is it 1 ,000 tonnes per 
annum or 20,000 tonnes per annum? 
• The price at which it can be sold. NDC reports that it can normally bear a 
premium of about 10% vis a vis maize meal. To which type of maize meal 
are they comparing? 
(a) sifted maize meal- retail 
Windhoek; 
(b) unsifted maize meal- retail 
Windhoek; 
(c) unsifted maize meal for the 
catering trade, delivered to 
institutions all over the country, or; 
(d) "straight-run", i.e. unrefined, maize 
meal- retail (Punyu) 
approx. $1.94 per kg in Windhoek for 
a 1 0/12.5kg bag 
approx. $1.50 per kg for a 1 0/12.5 kg 
bag 
$1.25 per kg for 50 kg bags 
$1.25-$1.36 per kg Ondangua, 
depending on bag size 
• If mahangu meal can be sold at a premium to maize meal, how much can 
be sold at different premiums? lt is unlikely that all customers will stop 
purchasing when the magic 10% figure is passed, but that there will be a 
gradual reduction of demand as price is increased. For a well-marketed 
product, there may still be significant demand when the meal costs 50% 
more than sifted maize meal. Given that it costs much more to produce 
mahangu than maize, it is important to estimate demand elasticity. 
• Appearance and flavour. There are widespread anecdotal reports that 
mechanically processed mahangu meal from NDC Musese is not as 
acceptable as traditionally processed mahangu. However taste panel work 
quoted by Dendy (1995) suggests the opposite. Are consumers simply 
reacting to the gun-metal grey appearance of meal produced from 
Okashana 1, or expressing a real taste preference for traditional varieties? 
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Can a more acceptable product be produced with Okashana 1, e.g. by 
bleaching? 
• Shelf life. There are reports of NDC products being returned by customers 
on account of deterioration after 6 months, but there are no clear 
guidelines concerning sell-by dates. 
• Processing costs. Dehulling machines used by NDC have very low 
capacity. Can they be scaled up to produce a continuous operation? If not 
what is the implication for production costs vis a vis processing of 
competing cereals? 
If NDC had treated the Musese processing facility as a pilot plant, and had 
sought to test-market mahangu meal as part of a new product development 
exercise, much might have been learnt about its marketability. However 
instead of this experimental approach, mahangu processing enterprise has 
been treated as a "going concern". Farmers have been growing mahangu on 
the basis of an unproven processing operation, both with regard to the 
economics and the marketability of the product. 
There is strong evidence, for example from studies by Keyler (1995), that a 
large part of the Namibian population prefers mahangu to maize meal, and 
this suggests that a well marketed product could be sold at a premium to Top 
Score maize meal, possibly at a premium well in excess of 1 0%. lt is even 
possible that with careful marketing new consumers can be won over from 
groups who do not traditionally consume mahangu. However given the 
uncertainties mentioned above, this preference does not automatically 
translate into consumer acceptance and sales of thousands of tonnes at the 
retail level. 
All that can be said with relative certainty is that mahangu can be sold as a 
commodity in competition with maize. According to NRC, mahangu could 
probably be sold for animal feed at prices in the range of N$650 to 
N$770/tonne ex-warehouse Oshakati or Rundu. Under existing tender 
procedures, Mahangu meal could probably be sold for institutional feeding in 
straight competition with maize, at a price of around N$1 ,250/tonne delivered 
to institutions around the country- given processing and distribution costs, 
this may not prove more attractive than sale in unprocessed form as animal 
feed. 
Public support for research on mahangu processing and marketing can be 
considered principally on the grounds of its benefits to consumers, given that 
it promisses to answer a need which is currently not being fulfilled by the 
market, i.e. regular availability of mahangu products on grocery shelves 
thoughout the country. Such research can also create an additional outlet for 
Namibian mahangu produced in Namibia, and absorb periodic farm 
surpluses. The development of popular mahangu consumer products is not 
only of interest to Namibia but also to neighbouring countries which have 
mahangu consuming populations, but where mahangu consumption has 
declined in relation to maize. 
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Government may therefore consider continuing the process of product 
development and market testing started by Dendy (1 993 and 1 995), with a 
view to: (a) overcoming the above uncertainties; (b) positioning mahangu 
meal and added value products in such a way as to maximise unit sales 
revenue. Products would need to be advertised so as to ensure their 
permanent presence on grocery shelves. However, to do this requires the 
involvement of a company (or companies) with skills in the development and 
marketing fast-moving consumer goods (FMCGs) and which already has a 
large presence in the market12. Depending of the company's existing skills, 
some additional technical assistance might be provided at public expense. 
The difficulty with this is that serious FMCG manufacturers or distributors are 
likely to be detered by uncertainty over raw material supply. Domestic 
supplies are far too unstable, so in most years they would need to be 
supplemented by imports, from India, Angola and/or other countries. The 
scope for finding suitable reasonably priced material (in what is essentially a 
thin world market) is currently being researched by NRC. Even if such 
supplies can be procured, Government will need to give assurances about not 
intervening in the market, for drought relief or other purposes, as this could 
upset the supply situation and deter manufacturers. 
In view of difficulties over raw material supplies, it may prove difficult to create 
a really large market for mahangu meal in Namibia, i.e. tens of thousands of 
tonnes per year. Notwitstanding smaller localised markets can be created 
through the expansion of custom milling in the NCA, and the commercial 
activities of companies (e.g. ELUWA) who are developing sales in response 
to domestic supplies and local marketing opportunities. 
12 Namib Mills is an obvious candidate, but there may be other suitable companies producing 
or distributing other kinds of consumer goods. 
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APPENDIX 5: SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS ON FARMER CONTROLLED 
ENTERPRISES 
Since the latter 1980s, co-operatives and similar group enterprises, which we 
collectively describe as Farmer-Controlled Enterprises (or FCEs), have been 
widely promoted by donors and NGOs all over Africa, as a response to the 
problems and challenges posed by market liberalisation. In principle this 
movement has been purely voluntary, but in reality sponsors have frequently 
made the belonging to an FCE a pre-condition to obtaining concessional 
resources under donor-funded projects. 
Recently NRI and the Plunkett Foundation were jointly commissioned by ODA 
(now DFID) to review these experiences and draw conclusions about factors 
leading to success or failure of FCEs in Africa. Following a desk-work phase, 
research was carried out in five countries, including Ghana, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Mali and Burkina Faso, and involved a review of the FCE sector 
and case studies of 19 specific enterprises - see Stringfellow et a/, 1997. 
The main finding emerging from this study was that donors were frequently 
promoting organisations which were too complex to be effectively managed, 
given current group management skills. As a consequence they frequently 
did not last long, and at times, members' negative experiences were 
contributing to undermining future co-operative initiatives. Processing 
operations, involving the joint operation of equipment were particularly prone 
to failure. 
Success in FCEs tended to be associated with: 
• small, homogeneous, village groups with clear member-driven agendas, 
and where members have frequent face-to-face interaction 
• simple marketing or procurement activities in which they can achieve rapid 
success, and where they have a comparative advantage vis a vis other 
suppliers of these services. 
Rather than federating vertically on co-operative lines, successful groups 
were tending to link directly with private service suppliers in the outside world. 
This does not rule out regional entities or federations, but it suggests that 
such organisations can only be as strong as their component parts. This all 
points to the need for small-scale and simplicity, and working from the grass-
roots upwards. 
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APPENDIX 6: NOTES ON MAINTENANCE, OPERATION, MANAGEMENT 
OF STORAGE STRUCTURES 
Maintenance 
Maintenance costs for sheds will be minimal in the first three years of 
operation. The condition of warehouse facilities seen in the NCA Regions 
indicates that the structures are likely to have a longer than average life-span 
in the very dry climate. The most important factor is to ensure that bag stacks 
do not lean against the walls of the storage structure causing cracking in the 
case of concrete cladding and buckling in metal structures. Lorries should not 
be allowed to enter warehouses for loading and unloading since doors and 
walls are quickly destroyed. 
Maintenance for open storage involves the annual replacement of plastic 
sheeting for the stack bases and replacement of canvas tarpaulins every 
three years. 
Operation 
Operating costs will be a function of the staff requirement for each facility. 
Since the most appropriate location for assembly point warehousing is in the 
production areas these will be small stores of 2,000 to 3,000 tonne capacity. 
NAB is currently renting storage facilities in Katima Mulilo and management 
costs are estimated at N$ 19 I tonne (for seasonal storage) to include 
preparation of the yard, intake labour costs, security and insurance, losses, 
out-loading and supervisory staff. This seems to be a reasonable estimate for 
operational costs for the NCA Regions. 
Management 
Effective storage management requires that: 
• the site and facilities to be used are fit for the purpose; 
• goods to be stored should be frt for storage; 
• the period of storage should be controlled if possible; 
• storage (intake) should be orderly and recorded; 
• quality should be maintained sufficiently for the intended use; 
• there should be security against theft and other losses; 
• any losses of quality or quantity which nevertheless occur should be 
identifiable and accountable; 
• discharge from storage should be timely, orderly and recorded; 
• the goods discharged should be in a form appropriate to the intended use. 
These requirements relate to general, essential principles. From them may 
be derived particular working rules. Essential principles are appropriate to all 
situations and circumstances, while working rules relate to particular 
situations and should be applied only as far as necessary in the actual 
circumstances. 
For example, "first-in first-out" is a useful working rule in storage, but it should 
not be rigidly applied in situations where there are sensible and acceptable 
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reasons for discharging goods on a more flexible basis. The essential 
principles are that discharge should be orderly and recorded and that the 
goods discharged should be satisfactory for the intended use. 
Scientific storage management requires scientific knowledge to be combined 
with the common sense approach. Good storage management, requires only 
that commodities are kept sufficiently dry, to prevent mould damage; 
sufficiently cool, to prevent serious damage by insects and mites; and 
sufficiently secure against theft and rodent damage. In some climates, these 
precautions are all that is necessary. However, in tropical climates the mean 
ambient temperature is generally favourable to insects and mites and it is 
often impossible or impractical to keep large stocks of cereal grains at a 
temperature low enough to prevent the multiplication of these pests. 
Therefore, if losses in quality and quantity are to be prevented, 
supplementary measures become essential. 
Fumigation 
The appropriate fumigant to be used is phosphine formulated under a number 
of trade names (Phostoxin, Celphos, etc.). Bagged grain in stacks is treated 
under gas proof fumigation sheets held tightly to the ground using sand 
snakes (note that plastic ground sheets must be used where the stack is not 
built on a concrete floor. This is particularly important on the sandy soils of 
the NCA Regions. Phosphine is applied at the rate of 1.5 gm per tonne for a 
5 day exposure period. Approximate fumigant costs are N$0.25/ tonne of 
grain. NAB estimate their application costs at around N$6.00 /tonne to 
include the fumigant. For maize and red sorghum, it is recommended that 
fumigation should take place every 4 months. With mahangu a 6 month 
interval is likely to be adequate, although this should be checked by regular 
inspection to look for moth webbing on stack surfaces which indicates 
infestation by the moth Corcyra cephalonica which is endemic in the NCA 
Regions. 
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APPENDIX 7: POINTS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN 
CONSTRUCTING A GRAIN STORAGE WAREHOUSE 
Though a grain storage warehouse may superficially appear similar to large industrial storage 
buildings, there are many features of design detailing which make it distinctly different. These 
features are described in this annex. lt must keep grain DRY, CLEAN, PEST-FREE, 
SECURE and SAFE, and FACILITATE HANDLING. 
Grain is a biological product. lt contains water and can absorb or desorb water (moisture) if 
external conditions allow it. High moisture content encourages germination and damage by 
bacteria, fungi and insects. These cause weight losses and reduce the nutritional value of the 
grain. If grain is kept at a certain moisture content, it can be safely stored for a long time - at 
low moisture contents it can be stored for years. For long term storage in Namibia the 
maximum allowable moisture content is 13 percent. Grain can absorb moisture in vapour and 
liquid forms. Water vapour will be absorbed slowly from humid air, liquid water is absorbed 
more rapidly. Sources of water include capillary water rising through a floor slab, flooding of 
the floor surface from heavy rains, wind-blown rain spray and rain-water leaks. Each of these 
sources of water must be systematically controlled by positive design features. 
Choose a suitable elevated site. This will keep out water from adjoining land; install a 
drainage network of adequate size, capacity and extent; and arrange for rapid disposal of 
collected water. 
Examine each site individually, during the rainy season, before design begins. Supplement 
direct observations and measurements by obtaining data from a meteorological station and by 
questioning local residents on the problems of the site. Design to prevent leaks in roof 
cladding and the drainage system. Specify strong or thick structural materials which will last 
for 20+ years without replacement and with low needs for maintenance. Ensure that collected 
water can flow away freely by designing appropriately dimensioned and angled gutters, 
intersections, and overall roof pitches. 
Roof pitch should be at least 15° to the horizontal unless there is local proof that flatter pitches 
can be rain-tight with normal workmanship. The normal or commonest roofing material is 
galvanised steel with corrugated or other profiles. Sheet runs should be as long as practicable 
for transport, since longer sheets reduce the number of end laps and the potential leaks. For 
corrugated sheets the minimum overlap at sheet ends is 150mm; at edges, two full 
corrugations (about 150mm). The correct sealing of the edges of the sheets and the roof bolts 
is important. The correct number of bolts per sheet is also very important. If there are too 
few, the sheets may rip due to the wind catching under the edges. 
A roof overhang of about 1 m is necessary to shade the ventilators underneath. In areas of 
low rainfall, such as in Namibia, this allows gutters and downpipes to be omitted entirely and 
roof water simply spills onto a pavement or into a ditch below. 
Prevent rising damp by incorporating a waterproof membrane in or under the floorslab. The 
membrane may only be omitted in zones of very low rainfall-say 200mm or less per year. The 
membrane's purpose is to block the rise of groundwater through capillary pores in the 
concrete, its subbase and the soil underneath. lt should not be assumed that open layers of 
selected hardcore material would be sufficient to disrupt this capillary action. The membrane 
can be a continuous layer of bitumen or asphalt sprayed onto a sub-layer of lean concrete; or 
a polythene sheet (minimum 1000 gauge) laid on a smooth layer of sand above blinded 
hardcore. Instruct construction workers to be careful to avoid puncturing the membrane when 
subsequently laying reinforcing steel and concrete on top of it. 
To discourage saturation of the floor subbase and walls, set floor level at least 150mm, and 
preferably 300mm, above surrounding ground or roadway level. Greater relative elevations, 
while convenient for loading trucks with grain in some circumstances, are not economically 
justified, and risk problems with settlement of hardcore and floor cracks; install an external 
pavement 0.75m to 1.00m wide around the external perimeter of the wall, below floor level, 
59 
with drainage channels or ditches at its outer lip and seal the pavement to wall and channel 
with cement mortar. 
Economical walls may be made of hollow concrete blocks or of metal sheeting. To limit block 
panels to 25m2, horizontal load-bearing beams have to be inserted. This adds considerably 
to the cost of the blockwork, and makes metal sheeting more competitive. Concrete blocks 
will absorb rain on their outer surface. This must not be permitted to soak freely through to the 
interior of the warehouse. To inhibit such spread of dampness, either specify high-density 
concrete blocks which possess a close surface texture; or point all mortar courses flush 
externally and internally, and seal the faces with a thin coat of cement-lime rendering or a 
sprayed slurry of cement-lime-sand or a thick and waterproof cementitious paint. Walls clad 
with steel sheeting should have sheets overlapping by one corrugation at sides and 1 OOmm at 
sheet ends. Corrugations normally are fitted vertically. Run the lowest row of sheets outside 
the lower wall or ground beam, so that water will be shed cleanly. Do not embed the sheet 
end in a fillet of cement mortar, because this creates a galvanic corrosion cell which rapidly 
ruins the metal. Any contact between metal sheeting and concrete must always be blocked 
with inert paint or bitumen. 
Ventilators are needed to remove humid air from the warehouse interior and to reduce the 
temperature for better working and storage conditions. The objective is most economically 
attained by locating screened apertures close under the eaves. This develops natural air 
currents which flush out stale and humid air particularly from the upper portions of the building, 
where it tends to accumulate due to convection. Ventilators need to be screened against birds 
and rodents. If they are long and narrow, and kept very close to the roof, entry of wind-driven 
rain is not likely to be a problem. The lower edge of the ventilator aperture should be no more 
than 1 m below the wall/roof intersection, and preferably less, to discourage entry of rain-drops 
and spray, and strong sunlight. Aperture width depends on climate and wall type. As a 
starting point, width is commonly half of the bay width. Increase the aperture width to full bay 
width in very hot or humid zones, or in stores with metal walls. The aperture tends to be 
reduced in windy zones and cool, dry zones, or with high walls of masonry or concrete block, 
but not to less than a 1/4 of the bay width. In end bays, stop the aperture 2m from the corner 
of the building, to prevent turbulent winds blowing rain in. Screen all apertures with mesh of 
woven wire or cut and stretched plate (2mm wire woven to form squares of 15mm or slightly 
smaller). Secure mesh to frame with thin strips of plate. Do not use fine 'insect-proof mesh, 
because this clogs easily and ruptures when someone tries to clean it. 
Design for a clean environment 
The warehouse is used to store valuable food commodities. No one likes food which has 
been carelessly mixed with foreign matter, or tastes and smells bad because of exposure to 
damp, or has been poisoned with pest excreta and chemicals. Some contaminant even make 
the food unfit for human consumption e.g. engine oil and accidently high-levels of chemicals 
used for pest control. 
Poorly designed floors are a frequent source of dust. Dust arises from weak or badly-cured 
surfaces, from cracks, or gathers in open joints. A well designed floor eliminates these dust 
sources, and is easy to sweep clean. Avoid placing a screed on top of the main structural 
slab. Screeds soon crack away, leaving ugly, dusty areas. Ensure that the slab and its 
surface are totally homogeneous and dense. Control the water content so that weak laitance 
(cement milk) does not bleed to the top during compaction. Use a heavy tamping beam as 
well as a poker vibrator, to obtain good compaction right through the whole depth of the slab. 
Trowel the surface firmly, using a rectangular wooden trowel, after the tamping beam has 
passed. This will yield a firm level surface. To smooth the surface, skim once or twice with a 
steel trowel initially and after the concrete has set for an hour or two. Finally, ensure that the 
new slab is properly covered and left undisturbed to cure. Minimise the number of joints in a 
floor slab. Carefully detail expansion joints, contraction joints and day-work joints. Pack the 
lower portion of a joint with a compressible filler (e.g., bitumen-impregnated chipboard) and fill 
the top 50mm with a stiff well-tamped mastic. To prevent cracks developing in the floor, close 
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attention must be paid to subbase compaction using a hand-steered vibrating roller close to 
walls as well as a heavy non-vibrating roller across the main width of the floor. Sub-layers of 
selected gravelly fill material should be rolled in layers not more than 250mm thick. Telford-
type stone hardcore must be strong, and set vertically before packing stones are hammered 
between them. Then spread a blinding coat of fine crushed stone chips and roll again, 
moistening as necessary to get good compaction. To prevent surface cracking reinforcement 
can be placed 50mm below the top surface. 
Proper casting and curing of all concrete surfaces goes a long way to controlling dustiness. In 
wall panels of concrete blocks, strike all mortar courses flush with the blocks' face (grooved 
courses inhibit drying after rain). Seal all porous-textured faces, to remove insect refuges and 
dust traps, as well as to control wetting and dirt retention. Cracks, which are dust sources and 
insect refuges, show up best against a light-coloured surface finish. Cementitious paints are 
the most durable, followed by 'plastic' water-based emulsions. Even limewash can be 
effective but it is relatively short-lived. Cream tints are the most suitable colour. Try to get a 
neutral pH in the surface finish, e.g. by adding salt to limewash, and consult manufacturers for 
other types. A lower pH helps pest-control sprays' effectiveness and longevity, because the 
sprays are slightly acidic and early applications become neutralised when in contact with high 
alkaline cement concrete. Smooth surfaces reduce the amount of spray chemical required for 
pest-control throughout the operational life of the warehouse. Smooth surfaces are also easy 
to brush clean of dust. 
If sliding doors are used the guide rails or channels can be difficult to keep clean. An 
upstanding lower rail is easier to clean than a sunken groove or channel in the threshold. lt is 
best located externally, where wind and rain tend to clean it. If a sunken groove is chosen, 
then make it wide enough to contain the whole thickness of the door, and deep enough to be 
free draining and easily brushed out. Again, external location is better, with open ends for 
draining away any water that may get into it. If a groove has to be situated inside the 
doorway, taper up the ends so that dust can be swept out easily. 
Trucks and other vehicles carry dirt into the warehouse on wheels and bodywork. Drivers 
may perform minor repairs and leave rubbish lying about. Heavy wheel loadings soon 
damage the best of floors. To control these nuisances, vehicles should not drive into the 
warehouse. Step the threshold, lower the lintel, or bolt a steel bar across a high doorway. Do 
not use barriers which would obstruct foot traffic. 
All trees within 20m of the warehouse should be cut down or at least topped. This will 
decrease the nuisance from fallen leaves (which block roof drainage) and birds (by 
discouraging roosting). Minimize horizontal ledges and other dust traps, particularly the 
frames of roof and doors. As far as possible, make surfaces smooth and inclined, and interior 
surfaces easy to brush clean. 
Pest infestation in all buildings can cause risks to human health, economic degradation of the 
contents, fire hazard and structural deterioration. Grain stores are specially prone to 
infestation because they contain foodstuffs which are very attractive to certain common pests. 
The rodent family includes rats and mice which can survive in a variety of environments, but 
some situations encourage rodents more than others. Rats need to drink water, but mice can 
survive on the moisture contained in the foodgrain. Infestation pressure may be seasonal. 
When there is plenty of food in the fields around the store, rodents may not seek to enter; but 
when this food source diminishes, the store and its contents are attacked persistently. 
Rodents are adept at burrowing, at climbing and at squeezing through small gaps. Once 
inside the warehouse they breed prolifically. They destroy sacks, consume large quantities of 
grain and excrete over even larger quantities. This gives grain an unattractive visual 
appearance and an unpleasant taste and smell. Rodents carry parasites, bacteria and virus 
diseases, which harm human health, in some cases fatally. Rodents may damage both 
structural fabric and fittings . They have to gnaw or chew at hard materials in order to keep 
their ever-growing teeth ground down. They shred soft materials to make nests. This can 
cause serious damage to electrical fittings and cables, to water pipes and to timber 
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furnishings, with subsequent dangers to humans and the stored commodity. Their burrowing 
activity can lead to localised subsidence. Rats (not mice) will burrow for great distances 
horizontally in loose soil and along drains, but seldom dig deeper than 750mm. Both rats and 
mice are excellent climbers. Rats have been observed to climb 6 courses of concrete blocks 
and mice 9 courses of smooth-faced bricks, using the mortar courses as a ladder. Both pests 
use corners, pipes and carelessly-strewn sticks to climb higher. Mice and young rats can 
squeeze through holes as small as 7mm in diameter. Where cables and pipes run through a 
wall, there is often a weak spot which rodents can scrape out to obtain entry. Some rats swim 
well and enter building through drains, sewers and W.C. pans. 
Birds can cause direct economic loss by consuming grain. They also cause damage 
indirectly. Their nests block gutters and downpipes, leading to water damage and their 
droppings encourage the growth of fungi on various surfaces. Birds carry parasitic insects, 
and sometimes pathogenic bacteria, which spoil grain and annoy workers. Their excreta and 
feather droppings are unsightly, spoiling the appearance of sacks, grain and building surfaces. 
Birds seek roosting and nesting places in or on buildings and nearby trees. But they find it 
difficult to perch on smooth, inclined surfaces, and dislike low trees close to traffic and people. 
The smaller birds can squeeze through holes larger than 13mm. 
A relatively small range of insect species become serious pests because they can thrive in 
unprotected stored grain, but the majority of species are not so well adapted. Once the insect 
pests are introduced, they can multiply very rapidly. These pests are controlled chiefly by 
spraying and fumigation using chemicals which, when properly mixed and applied, are highly 
toxic to the pests, but not harmful to humans consuming the food. Insects and mites can 
survive in an 'empty' store by taking refuge in dust, dirty floor joints and cracks, porous-
textured surfaces and rubbish. This residual infestation carries over into newly arrived grain, 
followed by an exponential growth in pest numbers and consequent grain damage. All such 
carry-over refuges must therefore be eliminated by design, careful construction and 
management and regular maintenance. 
Fungi (moulds) and bacteria require a damp environment for survival. Sources of dampness 
include construction water, condensation from the atmosphere, rising damp in floors and 
walls, porous wall surfaces, and leaks through roofs, ventilators and doors. Grain brought in 
for storage will normally be of a moisture content low enough to prevent the growth of fungi 
and bacteria. But grains must be prevented from absorbing moisture during its storage period 
and the best way is to keep the interior of the building and the stored grain scrupulously dry. 
Before any species can infest a building, individuals must first enter. They will survive only if 
the temperature and humidity are suitable and if prophylactic chemical poisoning has been 
omitted. Infestation can build up when they find adequate food and water, shelter, nest sites 
and nesting material. Physical measures to prevent infestation by fungi and bacteria depend 
upon excluding liquid water and dampness. 
If foundations do not rest on bedrock, then rodents will be excluded if the foundations extend 
900mm deep, or have an L-shaped curtain wall600mm deep with a 300mm projection 
outwards from the line. No breach in the foundations may be larger than about 9mm which is 
sufficient to prevent rats squeezing through. Masonry sub-walls should be well pointed below 
ground level and plastered with cement-sand render on the outer side from 1 OOmm below final 
ground level to 800mm above. Termites are excluded by poisoning the floor subbase, the 
grade beams, and a strip of soil about 300mm wide by 300mm deep around the outside of the 
building. The highly toxic and peristant chemicals Aldrin, Dieldrin and Chlordane are 
necessary. Cracked concrete, gaping joints, and floors of beaten earth or asphalt are an open 
invitation to all kinds of pest. Floors must therefore be of dense concrete, completely covering 
the area between the containing walls, with carefully constructed joints. Proper reinforcement 
of the slab strips, allied with thorough compaction of sub-base and base layers, is essential. 
Aim to prevent rodent access to the upper parts of walls. Stop rodents climbing up the walls 
by ensuring that blockwork has smooth faces, by striking mortar joints flush, by sealing around 
cables and pipes with cement mortar (admixture of 20 percent crushed glass gives added 
deterrence) for the full thickness of the wall, by grills on downpipes mouths, by using stand-off 
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brackets for downpipes, and by eliminating nearby jumping points. To control rodents access 
in the lower 1 m of wall, ensure that: foundations are rat proof; and there are no holes larger 
than 6mm on the external and the interior faces of the above-ground wall. Pay particular 
attention to the joint between column and blockwork panels. Seal cavities in hollow blocks to 
prevent both rodents and birds making use of them. Plaster or gloss paint the lower 800mm 
of wall above ground or pavement level. For walls clad with metal sheets, paint the outer face 
of the grade beam with smooth (slippery) bitumen, set the sheets tight against the beam face, 
and block the corrugations with contoured strips of metal or hardwood fastened to the top face 
of the grade beam inside. 
Doors and doorways are the most vulnerable point in defence against rodents and birds. 
Along the bottom and sides of doorways, ensure that gaps are 6mm or less, to exclude 
rodents. On heavy sliding doors the top suspension rail may be expected to sag. This will 
mean that the door eventually scrapes the threshold, causing difficulty when opened and 
closed. Adjustable hangers are needed. Pay special attention to the lower corners of the 
door and the guide rail or groove, so that these have no gap larger than 6mm when the door is 
closed. Where pairs of doors abut when closed, fit an overlapping lip to seal the interface to 
less than 6mm, for the full height of the door. Any doors made of wood should be faced with 
metal sheet along the bottom, to a height of not less than 300mm, to prevent rodents chewing 
at them. Wooden doorposts should be similarly protected. Fit any small doors in the 
warehouse with self-closing springs, to reduce the risk of rodent entry if the door is left open 
and unattended. Around the top of the door, ensure that gaps are 12mm or less. Fit a sloping 
hood above the rail of a sliding door, to discourage birds from roosting, and fit the end of the 
hood snugly to the rail. Cover any offset between rail and lintel beam with metal strips. 
Eliminate bird perches as far as possible. Incline unavoidable ledges at 45° or steeper. Fit 
screens flush with the external face of the wall. Reduce all gaps at eaves to 12mm or less. 
Contoured metal strips, profiled to match the corrugations of the roof sheets, can be fitted into 
the underside of the sheets and fastened to the wall-plate or adjacent purl in. The practice of 
stuffing the gaps with mortar works only if the mortar is firm and carefully packed into the gaps 
for the full thickness of the wall, and if the parts of the sheets touched by mortar have been 
previously coated with bitumen paint to prevent the cement corroding the metal. Carelessly 
packed mortar is soon dislodged by thermal and wind stresses on the roof sheets. Tight 
sealing is required at the ridge cap to exclude rain, this will also exclude birds. 
Pipes, cables, drains and ducts should be carefully built into the wall and sealed in a manner 
that excludes rodents. Pipework runs should allow for differential settlement of the wall and 
adjacent materials, so that the pipe will not be broken or its sealing to the wall disrupted. 
Avoid any external projections at fittings that might help rodents to climb the wall. Projecting 
skirts may be necessary around pipes and cable conduits. The lower 600mm of rainwater 
downpipes can be enclosed in smooth-rounded concrete shrouds. Block pipe mouths with 
grills (clearance between bars 6mm or less) which can be removed for maintenance. 
Rats and birds need to drink water. Therefore open water, e.g. in tanks or drains, should be 
avoided as far as possible. Design ditches and their outfalls to empty out completely. Cover 
tanks, manholes and inspection chambers with close-fitting vermin-proof lids, but ensure that 
these can be removed for maintenance and replaced without loss of effectiveness. General 
rubbish and garbage provides a food supply and shelter for all types of pest. lt is best to burn 
garbage and then bury it. At the warehouses and other buildings provide steel buckets and 
dustbins with lids, to encourage people to be tidy. 
During construction, keep the site as clean and tidy as possible. Destroy any termite 
creations on site, and spray the bases and adjacent land of new buildings with termite poison. 
After fresh concrete has had its curing period, ventilate new buildings thoroughly. This 
removes dampness, and prevents the growth of fungus on plaster and furnishings. When 
finally clearing up the site, plant bare areas with a creeping, low profile grass. The grass roots 
will control erosion, and the grass's low stature will not provide shelter for rodents. Trees are 
decorative, provide pleasant shade for workers and can help to keep the subbases of the 
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roadways drained and firm, but specify trees which will not grow taller than the warehouse 
walls or else of a type which can be cut back frequently (like Eucalyptus). Do not plant trees 
so close to the walls that they would provide jumping points for rodents, or that their roots will 
disturb foundations. 
Losses 
Physical losses of grain can arise from theft by humans and from consumption by large and 
small animals. Human thieves and large animals -cows, sheep, goats - require strong 
physical barriers to keep them out. The first defence is a strong, high (about 2.5 m) fence 
around the site, with similar well-fitting gates. Flood-lighting of site and buildings exteriors is 
worthwhile in high-risk neighbourhoods. 
At the warehouse structure itself, and also at the office and the store-rooms, design doors to 
be strong, tight fitting and lockable. The keys for mortise locks tend to get lost, so for the 
warehouse door it is better to padlock the door externally. If the keys are lost, it is possible to 
saw off the padlock without damaging the door. The tongues of brackets for the padlock 
should have over-dimensioned, elongated holes to accommodate slight wear and sag in the 
door suspension. Each warehouse door should be locked from the outside, to avoid opening 
other doors needlessly when working at only one doorway. 
Ventilation apertures should be high up in the wall, which makes them inherently difficult for a 
thief to gain access. In lower ancillary buildings, the windows or ventilators should be fitted 
with external bars or grilles through which a boy cannot squeeze, and sufficiently strong to 
resist a strong man. 
Another source of loss is spillage from torn sacks. Apart from rough handling, sacks can be 
torn by sharp corners or snags which may occur at doorways and low-level fittings. Such 
protrusions can also cause injury to people. Therefore make all likely corners, edges and 
other protrusions and surfaces smooth and rounded. Provide concrete aprons outside 
doorways, where trucks will stand, so that any spillage from burst sacks can readily swept up 
without collecting dust and dirt. 
Electrical wiring and fittings can cause fires or serious injury if they malfunction. Ensure that 
all electric parts are heavy duty, properly earthed, securely fixed, and sealed against ingress 
of water vapour, ignitable dust, insects, rodents and birds. External lamps need special 
attention to discourage birds from perching and fouling them. 
Choose the number, location and dimensions of doorways and doors which will make labour-
intensive grain handling as convenient as possible at reasonable cost. Door size and location 
is constrained by the number and size of the bays and it will often be economic to let the door 
be the full width of the bay. The minimum door size should not be less than 2 m high by 3 m 
wide (up to, say, 6 m wide). The height may be increased as convenient to meet the lower 
edge of the ventilators, or to suit the position of an intermediate beam that can serve as a 
lintel. For doors that are to be over 2.8m high, ensure that trucks are barred from entering. If 
the orientation of the store's major axis is east-west, the long sides will be subjected to less 
sunshine than the narrower sides but the prevailing wind should be taken into account. If the 
long side is perpendicular to the prevailing wind the amount of ventilation will increase causing 
a decrease in temperature. Doors in the long sides reduce carrying distances and make 
better use of floor space. They also reduce roadway requirements on some site 
configurations. In large stores, double-leaf, sliding doors are the most practicable, since the 
alternatives of hinged or roller doors have a higher maintenance requirement. Small, single-
person doors are not required, they serve no useful purpose which is not already provided by 
the large main doors. Fit doors externally and ensure that handles are permanently fixed in 
positions which cannot damage doorposts when the doors are opened. Locate stoppers on 
both the top and bottom guides of sliding doors to limit door travel. Any hinged doors should 
be fitted with stoppers and hooks to hold them in position against wind. Outside the doorway, 
design a concrete platform or loading dock, with dimensions to suit the movements of 
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labourers and trucks. Fit its outer lip with a wooden fender or bump-bar to stop trucks 
breaking the concrete. Above the doorway, provide a cantilevered canopy externally. This 
shades the doorway and workers from strong sunshine and from rain. The canopy should 
protrude sufficiently to cover the largest of trucks. If the canopy cannot be fully cantilevered 
but has to be supported by posts, keep the posts well back from where the truck will come, to 
prevent the post from accidental damage. 
All along the truck approach and departure lanes, install rocks or concrete bollards to keep 
vehicles away from the walls and drains channels, but guiding the vehicles in toward the 
loading dock. 
Avoid irregular floor surfaces and as far as possible, avoid steps within the warehouse. They 
are a nuisance and a potential danger to foot traffic. Differential settlement of sections of the 
floor slab can endanger stack stability, as well as being a danger to workers where slab edges 
stick up. This is yet another reason for ensuring that floor bases are well compacted. At joints 
between sections of the slab, provide tie rods, lubricated for half their length, across 
contraction joints. This will permit horizontal movement but prevent differential vertical 
movement. The long-strip method of casting floor slabs is preferable to the chequerboard 
pattern, because the long-strip method minimises the number of joints and zones of potential 
differential settlement. lt is also quicker and more economical to construct. 
Maintenance 
Maintenance is the work involved in keeping a building or pieces of equipment in good 
condition so that it continues to perform its function adequately. Maintenance protects the 
stored commodity, by preventing defects which would cause or contribute to deterioration or 
damage. All maintenance work aims at preventing defects from occurring. Storage costs are 
reduced by appropriate preventive maintenance. lt is too late to repair if the produce has 
already been damaged due to a fault in the roof. 
Preventive maintenance includes minor repairs and replacement of small components, with 
emphasis on prevention of serious defects and emergency conditions. The work is usually 
performed by a mobile, permanent team of maintenance technicians, with skills in all the 
common building and mechanical trades. Occasionally they may be supplemented by 
specialist technicians on short contracts for specific jobs. Major repairs can also be included 
in maintenance. However, for a well-maintained structure, major repairs imply some defect 
that normal maintenance intentionally did not cover. Large jobs are usually put out to contract, 
because they tend to overload the resources of the normal maintenance team. A planned 
maintenance programme is the best way to organize work on a storage building, storage site 
or piece of associated equipment. Planned maintenance saves costs, because major damage 
to structure and stock is prevented. A systematic plan ensures that no element is forgotten. 
Management can be smoothly organized, to avoid the worst of peak demands on 
maintenance staff. The Planned Maintenance Programme has three basic elements. Regular 
pre-planned inspection of each building, each site and each piece of equipment. During the 
inspection both potential defects and any actual damage or wear are recorded. Prompt 
execution of necessary repairs, replacements and servicing, according to set standards. 
Supervision to ensure that maintenance jobs have been performed in accordance with desired 
standards and within an agreed schedule. Planned Maintenance should begin as soon as a 
new building, site or piece of equipment is taken over and should then continue throughout its 
useful life. 
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APPENDIX 8: NOTES ON OPEN STORAGE ON POLES 
Points of immediate relevance in Caprivi 
Plastic sheeting of 500 gauge should be used for the base of each stack (to 
prevent escape of fumigant gas through the sand) and the poles used for 
dunnage should be of regular size and shape (Eucalyptus poles are suitable). 
The stacks can be built to at least 10 to 15 bags high at the eaves and bags 
above this level should then be angled to a peak to allow rainwater run-off. 
Rain water protection should be provided by canvas tarpaulins to prevent 
excessive heating and moisture relocation in the stack, and reduction in grain 
quality through stackburn and moulding in the top layers. If plastic covered 
sheets are to be used, these should only be on the walls of the stacks, and 
should not cover the entire stacks. The proper use of pole and sheet storage 
can be seen at the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) in Zimbabwe. Suitable 
canvas sheets can be imported from South Africa and Zimbabwe, and they 
should be in place by the beginning of the rains and be firmly roped. 
Making a 5,000 tonne maize stack - as practised at GMB 
The stack is 18 m wide by 54 m long and contains 100,000 x 50 kg bags. lt 
must be sited, wherever possible, on ground with a low water table, adequate 
runoff and good drainage. Typically it is raised on cambered, well-
consolidated earth areas with ditchdrains around. Nearby terminte nests 
must be destroyed. 
Old tarpaulins are used for groundsheeting, or plastic sheeting is used. In 
addition to providing a gas proof barrier, this facilitates clean recovery of any 
loose grain which may be spilled when the stack is broken, and protects bare 
ground from erosion around the edges. In the event that concrete hardstands 
are used instead of timber dunnage, it prevents ground moisture from rising 
into the bottom bags. 
Where timber dunnage is used, gumpoles are laid over the scrap tarp 
underlay on earth hardstands to ensure that the bottom bags do not absorb 
water from the ground or from surface run-off. At least two layers are used 
because, if the ground becomes waterlogged, a single layer can be 
submerged. Two metre length gumpoles, with 100 to 150 mm butts, are 
bound together with wire in the foundation layer. About 1 ,500 are needed for 
two layers on an 18 m x 54 m stack base. They are replaced every four 
years. The ends of the poles are aligned or trimmed so that they do not 
extend beyond the outer edgers of the bottom layer of bags, and wire ends 
are tucked away neatly. This ensures that, when fumigation is done, the 
edges of PVC sheets can be secured close to the base of the stack without 
being damaged. 
lt has a ridge about 9 m high, sloping down on each side at an angle of about 
21 degrees to eaves which are 6m high. This is to ensure that rain has 
sufficient run-off. A steeper slope may be difficult to climb, particularly when 
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the top tarpaulins are in position. Stack sides are sloped inwards at an angle 
of about 8.5 degrees to the vertical to prevent them collapsing outwards. 
A level border 0.6 m is provided around the base of each stack so that rolled 
bottom edges of gasproof sheets can be pressed down on it under sand babs 
when the stack is fumigated. To withstand any tendency to collapse, stacks 
are strongly constructed by bonding bags in alternating layers of 'headers' 
and 'stretchers' at right angles to each other. In alternate layers, two 
"bonding lines" are laid accross the width of the stack, one stretcher in from 
the ends of each 18 x 18 m section. All bags are packed tightly together with 
their ends overlapping. The outer bags are positioned carefully, using 
stretched twine as a guide. 
Efficient bag handling and good stack-building require experience and good 
supervision. Between 9 and 14 labourers working under a stackmaster can 
build a 5,000 tonne stack in about seven days. The first few layers can be 
built by manual labour alone, after which a bagstacker machine is used. A 
4.5 m stacker is used initially, but a 9 m machine is needed to finish off the 
stack. Stacks which cannot be built to full height and peaked before the start 
of the rains must have a sloping top throughout the construction period so 
that water cannot accumulate and seep through the tarpaulins. 
Stacks have to be protected from rain and from excessive exposure to direct 
sunlight. Both jute and woven polypropylene sacks are liable to burst if the 
fabric is weakened by UV radiation. If a stack is wetted by rain before the 
tarps have been fitted, grain in jute bags can absorb and sweat off about 12 
mm of water without damage. However with polypropylene bags it is 
suspected that water may percolate down into the stack. Tarpaulins should 
be re-proofed annually, and written off after four years of use. Grain in the 
top bags can be spoiled by stackburn and turn mouldy if top tarpaulins are not 
rolled aside frequently to dispel condensation which gathers on their 
undersides. This should be a daily depot routine except when prevented by 
wet weather. The task requires 8 men working under a stackmaster and 
takes about 1.25 hours for a 5,000 tonne stack. 
Fumigation is the principal means of controlling infestation and phosphine 
formulations should be used at the rate of 3 to 5 tablets (equivalent to 3 to 
5gms of phosphine) per tonne. Stacks must be covered with gas proof 
fumigation sheets which are left in place for 5 days. 
Bug et 
Costs are in 1994 Zimbabwe dollars; the average rate of exchange was Z$ 8 
=US$ 1. Ground preparation is not costed, given that the cost will vary 
widely depending on local conditions. Labour and stacking machines are not 
costed, given that GMB uses these for stacking in warehouses and outdoors, 
so the cost is not highly relevant to a comparison of costs for different storage 
structures. 
Calculations are as follows: 
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Poles 
Black polythene 
Tarpaulins 
Sub-total 
1,500@ Z$ 8 
4 rolls @ Z$ 115 
9 X Z$ 8,500 
+ contingency - 1 0% 
Total in 1984 Z$ 
Total in 1984 US$ = Z 97,856/8 
Inflation- 3 years at 2% 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Total in 1997 US$ = 
Total in 1997 Namibian dollars= US$12,966 x 4.7 = 
Cost per tonne stored = N$60,940/5,000 = 
Approximately N$ 12 per tonne 
Additional cost using a permanent concrete plinth 
Cost per sq m of plinth - quoted in Oshakati 
Cost including N$ 25 per sq m contingency 
Plinth size for 5,000 sq m stack = 20 x 56 sq m 
Cost of plinth = 1 , 120 x N$ 300 
Cost per tonne capacity = N$ 336,000/5,000 
Cost per tonne including poles, tarpaulins etc. 
= N$ 12.2 + N$ 67.2 
Approximately N$ 80 per tonne 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
z 12,000 
z 460 
z 76.500 
z 88,960 
z 8.896 
z 97,856 
US$ 12,232 
US$ 734 
US$ 12,966 
N$ 60,940 
N$ 12.2/tonne 
N$ 275 
N$ 300 
1,120 sq m 
N$336,000 
N$ 67 .2/tonne 
N$ 79.4/tonne 
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